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vAbstract
In this thesis, I study the use of regulation as a redistributive policy and its implica-
tions on economic and political outcomes.
In the first chapter of this thesis, I remark that regulation has distributive and
welfare consequences, making it a powerful political tool. I show that when the regu-
lation is on goods for which all of the citizens have similar consumption behaviour,
a highly unequal society funds the costs of those goods mostly through general
taxation; instead of tariffs charged to users. Importantly, when the poor have access
to only the essential goods in the economy, regulation becomes a strong political tool,
and it is poverty rather than inequality that determines the use of regulation.
In the second chapter, I start with the observation that corporations devote costly
efforts to gain access to candidates before elections. These pre-electoral attempts take
many forms and commonly result in a welfare loss. Then, I explore the consequences
of the access of a monopolistic firm to a candidate on the regulatory policy. I show that
when the firm transfers a private interest to a popular candidate, regulation results in
gains for both the firm and the candidate; and a welfare loss for the voters. Instead,
this welfare loss does not take place when the firm uses campaign contributions as
signals to communicate private information. From this perspective, there are benefits
in permitting interest groups to fund political campaigns.
The third chapter is motivated by the fact that developing countries subsidise the
tariffs of public utilities such as electricity or transportation with high costs in terms
of the quality and sustainability of the utility provisions. Even when governments
repeatedly claim that the main goal of these subsidies is to improve the well-being
of the poor, most literature has explained the use of these tools is driven by income
inequality rather than the poverty rate. In contrast, I study the effect of the size
of the poor on the choice of the mix of regulation and other traditional forms of
redistributive policy. I begin by showing that the poor are better characterised by
their consumption bundle than their income. Consequently, when the public utilities
are essential for the poor, a higher poverty rate leads to a larger amount of subsidies
to utilities and a smaller size of income redistribution.
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1Chapter 1
Regulation as a redistributive
policy
1.1 Introduction
Regulating the provision of goods and services that significantly affect the well-being
of large groups of citizens creates an incentive to use regulation for gaining political
support. As a consequence, in many countries, governments make extensive use of
regulation as a tool for redistributing well-being towards groups that have significant
weight in the total vote. Importantly, this practice happens at a welfare cost in terms
of efficiency.
The use of regulation as a redistributive policy is widely documented in several
regions around the world. As an illustration, I consider the case of Latin America and
the Caribbean (LAC). Since the second half of the 2000s, the costs of energy generation
had been steadily high due to the increase in the price of oil. This event triggered
strong political pressures to subsidise the consumption of energy, such as residential
electricity, by reducing the direct charges to users. In spite of the potentially negative
effects on the efficiency and quality of the provision of the service, the subsidies
were applied almost everywhere; and they represented a share of the government
spending comparable to that of education and health combined. Furthermore, the
amount of subsidies on the electricity provision were higher in low-income countries;
in countries with higher poverty rates; and in those that rank lower according to
institutional quality indicators.1
1See Gabriel Di Bella et al., 2015 for a descriptive analysis of the energy subsidies in LAC during the
period 2011-13.
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My goal in this paper is to study those characteristics of a society that are more
influential in the selection of the regulatory policy in democracy. In particular, I
seek to find the political economy trade-offs that explain regulation as redistributive
policy. This question is relevant since governments usually claim that the main
motivation for regulating the provision of essential services like water or electricity
is the improvement of the well-being of the poor by facilitating their access and use.
This contrasts with most of the literature on redistribution in democracies which
focuses on income inequality, ignoring the importance of the poverty rate as a crucial
factor explaining the redistributive policies.
I construct a model of democracy where the society collectively chooses the
regulation of a monopolistic firm. The firm provides a good or service produced
under a decreasing average costs technology. The citizens in the society, who are fully
characterised by their income, consume the monopolistic good as well as a second
good provided under perfect competition.
I use the model to explore two different regulatory policies. On one hand, the
policy comprised of the variable price paid by the consumers of the monopolistic
good and an income tax collected from the society as a whole, and used to subsidise
the monopolistic firm when it incurs losses. The influence of inequality on this class
of regulatory policy is as follows. The larger the relative number of low income
citizens in the society, the more the tariff of the monopolistic good is below the
marginal cost; and therefore, the larger the firm losses that must be covered by funds
coming from general taxation. This result captures the political incentives to bias
the regulatory policy towards the preferences of the more numerous low income
voters. As a consequence, most of the costs of providing the monopolistic good are
transferred to the high income citizens via taxation.
On the other hand, I examine the case of a two-part tariff where the pricing
component of the regulatory policy consists of a fixed fee per consumer and a variable
price. Under a policy of this class, a society with a high frequency of low income
citizens chooses the lowest fixed fee such that most of the costs of providing the
monopolistic good are covered by taxation. On the contrary, when the high income
citizens are in majority, their influence results in the highest fixed fee; while the
subsidy to the monopolistic firm (collected from general taxation) reaches the lowest.
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Importantly, the model captures the effect of the poverty rate on the regulatory
policy as follows. Since preferences are represented by quasilinear utility functions,
those citizens in the society who have an income small enough consume only the
monopolistic good. As a result, the regulatory policy affects the poor and the rest
of the society in different ways. When the number of the poor is large, what mostly
explains the level of subsidies present in the tariffs of the essential good, is poverty
instead of inequality. This result helps explain why these subsides are particularly
high for good and services that represent a high portion of the budget of the poor;
and in countries with high poverty rates.
The use of regulation as a redistributive policy is not without costs. In this paper, I
capture the welfare costs of regulation by comparing the aggregate consumer surplus
under democracy with the consumer surplus that results from the policy set by a
benevolent central planner.2 I show that in almost every society where the regulatory
policy is collectively chosen by voting, there exist costs in terms of welfare.
The relevance of the paper in the context of the related literature is assessed in
Section 1.2. Section 1.3 lays out the model and explains a poverty line that depends
on the regulatory policy and is defined by the consumption behaviour of the citizens.
Section 1.4 studies how sensitive is the regulatory policy under democracy to the
income distribution of the community. Section 1.5 examines the case of a two-part
tariff regulatory policy; and contains a welfare analysis in terms of efficiency. Section
1.6 discusses the relation between poverty and regulation. Section 1.7 concludes, and
opens further research questions. Appendices 1.8.A, 1.8.B and 1.8.C contain all the
proofs.
1.2 Related Literature
In this paper, I explore the incentives for using regulation as a redistributive policy in
democracies; and assess the costs of this practice in terms of welfare.
The dominant approach to study regulation starts from the assumption that
those individuals or institutions in charge of designing the regulatory policy seek
2For instance, in the case of a two-part tariff regulatory policy, the central planner chooses a Coasian
Solution where the variable price equals the marginal costs and the fixed costs are fully covered by the
fixed fee component of the price (Coase, 1946).
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to promote the public interest. The reason for such assumption is that these papers
ask what mechanisms are the most effective in pursuing the maximum social welfare
when regulators do not have as much information as the firms about the regulated
business (Baron and Myerson, 1982 and Laffont and Tirole, 1986). Other papers in the
same tradition explore the situation where regulation is delegated to an agency; and
characterise the enforceable instruments that better prevent the regulatory agency
from being captured by private interests (Laffont and Tirole, 1991a and Laffont and
Martimort, 1999).
I depart from the dominant approach by considering the purely opportunistic
incentives of policymakers that seek to win elections. In this line, my paper is closer
to Baron, 1988 who introduces electoral incentives by studying a legislature that by
majority rule chooses the mandate of a regulatory agency. However, in line with
the dominant approach, Baron assumes this agency faithfully regulates a privately
informed firm.
My paper is a continuation of a seminal political economy literature that studies
regulation as a redistributive policy. For instance, Aranson and Ordeshook, 1981
test together several explanatory models of public-sector activity, to find out if they
can be applied to regulatory decision making. They first interpret regulation as a
redistributive activity, and assess the implications of this interpretation in an electoral
context. Abrams and Lewis, 1987 develop a median-voter model to analyse issues of
economic regulation and public policy outcomes. They provide comparative statics
relating changes in public-policy outcomes to changes in relative group sizes, total
population, information costs, and population heterogeneity. These papers provide a
meaningful starting point to address positive questions on regulation from a political
economy perspective. Nonetheless, they do not investigate the specific characteristics
of the society that influence the regulatory policy in different industries. In this paper,
I ask for which good and services it is income inequality that defines regulation; and
for which others, it is the poverty rate.
My paper is also close to the literature on redistribution and the size of the gov-
ernment (Meltzer and Richard, 1981 and Persson and Tabellini, 1994, among others);
which documents a positive relation between income inequality and a universal lump
sum redistribution. In this paper, I find a similar correlation between inequality and
1.3. The Model 5
the size of regulation measured by the amount of subsidies used to reduce the tariffs
of the regulated goods to users. However, I show when the regulation is on goods and
services that are essential for the poor, is poverty what mainly explains the regulatory
policy. This result is explained by the consumption behaviour of the poor for which
they have access to only essential goods and services. Therefore, in this scenario,
the positive correlation between inequality and redistribution that results from the
literature on redistribution and the size of the government may fail to exist.
There also exist several studies that explore the presence of efficiency costs that
result from regulating specific industries with a redistributive aim. For instance,
Burns, Crawford, and Dilnot, 1995 describe the distortionary effects of using the
revenues from indirect taxation on fuel (that increases the prices of several goods and
services) to subsidise the tariff of an essential public utility like residential electricity.
Faulhaber, 1996 develops a model to study the regulation of the telecommunication
industry. He provides the conditions for which the median voter price lowers the
aggregate welfare of the citizens by more than the unregulated price. And Ye and
Yezer, 1992 present similar results for the regulatory pricing of freight movements in
spatial monopolies.
1.3 The Model
There are two goods in the economy. The good x, produced by a linear technology
with constant average cost ρ. And the good y, subject to decreasing average costs that
make monopoly the natural industrial structure. The technology for producing good
y is given by the costs function C(θ, y) = θy + K where θ is the marginal cost, K is
the fixed cost, and y is the total production of good y.
The communityV consists of a unit mass of citizens who receive utility from the
consumption of the goods x and y according to the generic function,
u(xj, yj) = v(yj) + xj (1.1)
with j ∈ V ≡ [0, 1], and v(yj) strictly concave. Each of the citizens is endowed with
an exogenous income ω j3 distributed according to a well-behaved continuous density
3Superscripts denote attributes while subscripts refer to choices.
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function f (ω j) that is strictly positive over the interval [ω−,ω+] and zero elsewhere.4
The utility functions in 1.1 are quasilinear, and therefore, they represent a situation
where for some citizens the consumption of the non-linear good (y) is not sensitive to
changes in income. Such a situation is a characteristic of the consumption of public
utilities like electricity and water. To illustrate when it is the case that the demand
for y is independent of the income, I consider the functional form v(y) =
√
y for the
non-linear part of the utility function. Then, for a given pair of prices (px, py), the
program of the generic citizen j is given by,
Max
xj,yj
u(xj, yj) =
√
yj + xj
s.t. ω j ≥ pxxj + pyyj; xj ≥ 0; yj ≥ 0
This program results in the closed-form demand functions,
xj = x(px, py;ω j) = max
{
ω j
px
− 1
4
px
py
; 0
}
yj = y(px, py;ω j) = min
{
1
4
(
px
py
)2
;
ω j
py
}
,
(1.2)
where the demand for y does not depend on the income for citizens with income high
enough. Furthermore, demands in 1.2 define the indirect utility function,
ψ(x(px, py;ω j), y(px, py)) = max
{
1
4
px
py
+
ω j
px
;
√
ω j
py
}
(1.3)
The demands in 1.2 and the indirect utility function in 1.3 convey that part of
the citizens in the community does not have sufficient income to consume a strictly
positive quantity of both goods. The logic is as follows. Starting with ω j = 0 and
increasing the income by a small amount (one unit), the increment in utility that
comes from spending one extra unit on y is v′(ω j/py)/py. If this value is greater than
the increment of utility from the consumption of x, 1/px, then the citizen is better
off spending the whole unit of income on good y, and therefore, zero on x. And this
pattern will continue until the marginal utility of an extra unit of income spent on
good y just equals 1/px. After this point, any further increase in income is spent on
4As the community is of a unit mass,
∫ 1
0 f (ω
j)dj = 1. Moreover, I assume ω j is an increasing function
of j; i.e., citizens are ordered according to their level of income.
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the good x.
Following this logic, the next definition provides an expression for the threshold
that divides the community in two groups; one comprised of all the citizens with
income greater than the threshold, who consume strictly positive quantities of both x
and y; and the other, the poor group, of those citizens who only consume good y.
Definition 1 (Income threshold - poverty line). For a pair (px, py) ∈ R2+, the income dis-
tribution with density f (ω j) and support [ω−,ω+] has a income threshold ω0 ∈ [ω−,ω+]
defined as,
ω0(px, py) = v′−1(
py
px
)py (1.4)
if and only if ω− < ω0(px, py). Furthermore, all the citizens with income below ω0(px, py)
consume only the good y.
When ω− < ω0(px, py), the aggregate demand of good y suffers a kink at ω0. As
a consequence, ω0 defines two different groups of consumers, the poor and the rich.
In section 1.6, I assess the consequences of the existence of these two different groups
of consumers on the regulatory policy. Importantly, the existence of the poor who
only consume essential goods such as public utilities critically determines the relative
political efficacy of using subsidies to tariffs to redistribute well-being.
1.4 Income distribution and price-tax regulation
Throughout the analysis in this section, I assume that all the citizens have an income
high enough to consume positive quantities of both goods (there are no poor). As a
consequence, the main factor explaining the regulatory policy is income inequality.
On account of this feature, I examine the effect of the income distribution in the
society on a regulatory policy comprised of the variable price of the monopolistic
good (the tariff to users) and an income tax used to subsidise the firm in case it incurs
losses. I characterise a regulatory policy of this class that is collectively selected in
democracy; and assess its consequences in terms of efficiency.
I first define the efficiency benchmark as the regulatory policy set by a benevolent
central planner. Formally, I suppose there exists a central planner who aims to max-
imise the sum of the consumers’ surplus plus her subjective value of the monopolistic
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firm’s profits. The profits are valuable since they positively affect the quality and sus-
tainability of the good provision; for instance, by stimulating long-run investments.
The central planner chooses a variable price for the monopolistic good py ∈ R+, and
a linear income tax rate t ∈ [0, 1] that is transferred to the firm as a subsidy. Moreover,
I assume the central planner is constrained to non-negative after-subsidy profits. As
a result, the central planner selects the regulatory policy,
(pcpy , tcp) ∈ argmax
(py,t)
{CS(py, t) + βΠ(py, t) | Π(py, t) ≥ 0} (1.5)
where β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the subjective weight the central planner assigns to the
profits; CS is the aggregate consumer surplus of all citizens in the communityV; and
Π represents the after-subsidy profits of the monopolistic firm.
The aggregate consumer surplus CS(py, t) in 1.5 is obtained from the indirect
utility functions in 1.3 (assuming v(y) =
√
y and px = 1), by integrating over the
price and the citizens,5
CS =
∫ ∞
py
1
4
s−2ds + (1− t)
∫ 1
0
ω j f (ω j)dj (1.6)
The second component of the central planner’s objective function is the after-subsidy
profits defined as the sum of the operating profits and the total amount of tax col-
lected,
Π = (py − θ)y(1, py)− K + t
∫ 1
0
ω j f (ω j)dj (1.7)
The next proposition shows that any of the types of the central planner (any
possible value β ∈ (0, 1) for the benefits of the profits on the provision of good y)
chooses a variable price below the marginal cost. Moreover, the variable price of the
regulated good is increasing in the weight the central planner assigns to the profits of
the monopolistic firm. At one end, when the weight to the profits is close enough to
one, the variable price is close enough to the marginal cost. At the other end, when
the central planner values the profits the least, she sets the price at the minimum pLy .
5The opposite of the derivative of the indirect utility function w.r.t. to the price py is the demand for
good y (by Roy’s identity), y(1, py) = 14 p
−2
y . Since the demand y(1, py) does not depend on the income,
y(1, py) satisfies the Gorman polar form (Gorman, 1953). And therefore, the aggregate consumer surplus
is given by the sum of the integral of the demand functions over price and the total income of the
community.
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Proposition 1 (The regulatory policy by a central planner). A benevolent central planner
chooses a variable price,
pcpy =
(
2β
1+ β
)
θ (1.8)
which satisfies,
(a) pcpy is increasing in the central planner’s value of the profits;
(b) limβ→1− p
cp
y = θ;
(c) limβ→0+ p
cp
y = pLy ;
with pLy =
1−√1−16Kθ+16tLωθ
8(K−tLω) and t
L =
√
7
√
7ω2−240θkω2+120θkω−7ω
225θω2 .
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.A, proposition 1.8.A.1.
Proposition 1 states that the marginal cost is the upper bound of the variable price
chosen by a benevolent central planner. As a consequence, all the possible types
of the central planner transfer a positive amount of subsidies to the monopolistic
firm. The amount of the subsidies (the variable price) is decreasing (increasing) in the
benefits of the profits on the intertemporal provision of the regulated good. In the
limit, when these benefits reach the highest (β→ 1), the amount of subsidies equals
the value of the fixed costs (See Appendix 1.8.A, corollary 1.8.A2).
1.4.1 The regulatory policy in democracy
In this subsection, I characterise the situation in which the community chooses
the regulatory policy via elections. I show how the trade-off between funding the
provision of the monopolistic good via price to consumers and via general taxation
hinges critically on the position of the median income relative to the average income.
Furthermore, I compare the regulatory policy in a democracy with the policy set by
the central planner.
Formally, I assume the communityV elects one of the candidates l or r to imple-
ment the regulatory policy comprised of the pair (py, t). The sequence of events is
as follows. The candidates, who only care about winning the election, present their
enforceable and verifiable platforms (pyl, tl) and (pyr, tr). Then, each of the voters
j ∈ V sincerely casts a ballot for one of the candidates. The winner is elected by
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simple majority, and once in office, she implements her announced platform. In the
case of a tie, each candidate wins with probability one-half.
In order to assure the existence of an equilibrium for the regulatory policy in
a democracy, it is sufficient that the preferences of the citizens are defined over a
one-dimensional policy space. And also, that the preferences satisfy the single-peaked
condition for which each citizen has an ideal policy, and the further the policies are
located from the ideal point the less preferred they are.
The preferences of all citizens in V satisfy the two conditions of existence as
follows. On one hand, the preferences of the citizens are decreasing in both the price
and the tax rate. On the other hand, the profits are increasing in both components
of the regulatory policy. As a consequence, all citizens prefer a binding constraint of
non-negative after-subsidy profits. Therefore, the preferences of the citizens can be
fully defined over one policy component; for instance, the price of the monopolistic
good. Furthermore, the utility functions that represent the citizens’ preferences are
single-peaked because any reduction in the price requires an increase in the tax rate
to restore the zero-profits budget constraint.
Then, by the median voter theorem, both candidates announce the platform that
maximises the utility of the median income citizen; as it is shown in the next lemma.
Lemma 1 (Median income regulation). Suppose that each of the citizens inV casts one
vote for candidate l or r based on the candidates’ announced platforms. Then, if the winner is
elected by simple majority,
(a) for any t ∈ [0, 1] and every price below the monopoly price (py ≤ 2θ)6, the citizens’
preferences are over a one-dimensional policy space;
(b) the citizens’ preferences are represented by single-peaked utility functions;
(c) both l and r announce the platform that maximises the utility function of the median
income citizen.
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.A, lemma 1.8.A.3.
Lemma 1 states that democracy results in the regulatory policy that is most
preferred by the median income citizen. Furthermore, as depicted in figure 1.1, the
6See Appendix 1.8.A for the proof of the unregulated monopoly solution.
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Figure 1.1: Citizens’ preferences are represented by single-peaked utility
functions. The price at which the utility reaches the maximum (the peak)
positively depends on the income of the citizens. The curves are presented
in ascending order of income as follows: green-orange-blue. (The curves are
calibrated at u =
√·, K = 1, θ = 1).
higher the income of any citizen, the higher her ideal price of the monopolistic good.
Therefore, a higher price and lower taxation are expected when the income of the
median voter is higher. In the next proposition, I provide a closed-form for the
median income’s ideal price and tax rate; and I characterise how the regulatory policy
depends on the distance between the median and the average income.
Proposition 2 (Income distribution and the regulatory policy). The pair (pmy , tm) which
maximises the utility of the median income citizen is unique and satisfies,
(a) pmy =
(
ω
ωm + 1
)−1
2θ;
(b) tm = 1ω
[
K− 18θ−1
(
( ωωm + 1)− 12
(
ω
ωm + 1
)2)];
(c) if the median income is below the average income (ωm < ω), then the price is below the
marginal cost (pmy < θ). In contrast, if ωm > (=)ω, then pmy > (=) θ.
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.A, proposition 1.8.A.4.
Proposition 2 has two main takeaways. First, it captures the positive relation
between inequality and the amount of subsidies paid to the monopolistic firm. Since
inequality is defined as the distance between the median and the average incomes, a
lower median income (higher inequality) leads to a lower price of the monopolistic
good and higher tax collection to fund its provision. As an illustration, I refer to
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a public utility such as electricity. In this case, the result conveys that the more
unequal a society, the lower the tariffs of electricity to users and the higher the
amount of subsidies to the electric companies. This result is in line with the literature
on inequality and redistribution (see for instance, Meltzer and Richard, 1981 and
Persson and Tabellini, 1994) for which an increase in inequality leads to a larger size
of the government.
The second takeaway comes from the comparison of the regulatory policy in
democracy with the one set by a benevolent central planner. In the previous section, I
claimed that any type of central planner sets a price of the monopolistic good below
the marginal cost. In democracy instead, this result only takes place when the median
income is below the average income, and can be interpreted as the ability of the “poor”
(who are a majority) to transfer the cost of the good to the richer voters through higher
taxes. Alternatively, when the median income is above the average, the “rich” avoids
taxes by setting a price higher than the marginal cost, but still below the unregulated
monopoly price (pM = 2θ).
1.5 Income distribution and two-part tariff regulation
The pricing of monopolistic goods and services where the provider has control over
the access to those products is usually comprised of two parts; a fixed fee that does
not depend on the quantity consumed, and a price per unit. This two-part tariff
pricing strategy is commonly applied in the regulation of public utilities like the
provision of electricity, water or gas. In this section, I examine how the two-part tariff
regulatory policy in a democracy depends on the income distribution of the society;
and compare the results with the policy set by a benevolent central planner.
Formally, I consider a regulatory policy comprised of a lump sum fixed fee
F ∈ R+, common to all citizens; a per-unit price of good y, py ∈ R+; and a linear
income tax rate t ∈ [0, 1].
In the absence of regulation, a monopolistic firm sets a per-unit price that equals
the marginal cost, and extracts the whole consumer surplus through the fixed fee.
In spite of the efficiency of this monopoly solution, the fact that all the consumers’
surplus is fully captured by the firm makes it not desirable.
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For this reason, I choose the efficiency benchmark provided by a simple version
of the Coasian solution (Coase, 1946) as follows. A regulatory policy (p∗y, F∗, t∗) is
efficient if and only if the price is set at the marginal cost (p∗y = θ); the subsidies paid
to the firm are zero (t∗ = 0); and the sum of the fixed fees paid by all the consumers
equals the fixed costs (F∗ = K).7
1.5.1 The median income’s two-part tariff
Once again, I consider the situation in which the community collectively chooses by
majority rule one of the candidates l or r to implement the regulatory policy.
In the two-part tariff case, the regulatory policy has three components; py, F, and
t. And therefore, even when the constraint of after-subsidy zero profits is binding,
finding a majoritarian solution becomes a multidimensional problem. Grandmont,
1978 proves that if the preferences for multidimensional policies can be projected on
a unidimensional trait; then, the policy chosen by majority rule has a unique solution
that coincides with the policy that is most preferred by the median voter. Following
this argument, I first define intermediate preferences in the context of my model.
Definition 2 (Intermediate preferences in regulation). An indirect utility function of the
policy (py, F, t) represents intermediate preferences if it can be written as,
ψ(py, t;ωk) = α(py, t) + φ(ωk)γ(py, t) ;
where φ(ωk) is monotone in ωk ; and α(py, t) is common to all citizens.
(1.9)
In the next lemma, I show that the citizens’ preferences for a two-part tariff
regulatory policy (represented by the indirect utility function in 1.36) can be projected
on the citizens’ exogenous income; and therefore, the regulation in democracy has a
unique solution that coincides with the policy that is most preferred by the median
income citizen.
Lemma 2 (Median income solution for two-part tariff and taxation). The citizens’ indi-
rect utility functions over the triple (py, F, t) satisfy the intermediate preferences condition;
i.e., citizens have only one characteristic (their income) and the indirect utility function is
7For a review of the discussion on the efficient pricing in decreasing average costs industries, see
Frischmann and Hogendorn, 2015.
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monotone on this characteristic. Then, a unique Condorcet winner exists and coincides with
the policy that is most preferred by the median income citizen.
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.B, lemma 1.8.B.1.
In order to characterise the median income solution for the two-part tariff regula-
tion, I first note that for a given per-unit price, the fixed fee must be small enough
such that the utility from consuming a positive quantity of y is higher than the utility
from spending all the income on good x. Otherwise, all the citizens would consume a
zero quantity of y.8 I call the maximum fixed fee for which the citizens still consume
a positive quantity of y, the reservation fixed fee.
In this environment, the next proposition shows that if the society has a higher
frequency of high income citizens (the median income is higher than the average),
regulation results in zero taxation, provided the reservation fee is enough to compen-
sate the costs of the monopolistic good. Otherwise, only the margin of costs above
the reservation fixed fee must be covered by taxation. The proposition also shows
that when the median income is below the average the fixed fee is zero; and as a
result, all the costs of providing good y (that exceed the revenues collected through
the per-unit price) are transferred to the higher income citizens via taxation. Lastly,
when the income distribution is symmetric, the median income citizen is indifferent
between any combination of fixed fee and taxation; and her utility only depends on
the per-unit price.
Proposition 3 (Income distribution and the choice between tax and fixed fee). For
a given per-unit price py, the reservation fixed fee for all the citizens in V is given by
FR = 14 p
−1
y . Furthermore, the median voter pair (F
m, tm) depends on the position of the
median income (ωm) relative to the average income (ω) as follows,
(a) when ωm > ω,
(Fm, tm) =

(
FR,
−Πbs − FR
ω
)
i f FR < −Πbs
(−Πbs, 0) i f FR ≥ −Πbs;
8I note that when there are no poor, the consumption of y is independent of the income; and therefore,
all citizens consume the same amount of y.
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(b) when ωm < ω,
(Fm, tm) = (0,
−Πbs
ω
); (1.10)
(c) when ωm = ω,
{
(Fm, tm) ∈ [0, FR]× [0, 1] | tm = −Π
bs − Fm
ω
}
; (1.11)
where Πbs = 14 (py − θ)(py)−2 − K is the value of the before-subsidy profits.
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.B, proposition 1.8.B.2.
The first straightforward comparison between the two-part tariff regulation in
democracy and the one that results from a Coasian solution comes from assuming a
per-unit price that equals the marginal costs. In this case, the only difference is the
way of covering the fixed costs of producing the monopolistic good. On one hand,
when the median income is below the average, democracy results in a regulatory
policy where the whole value of the fixed costs are paid through general taxation;
while in the Coasian solution, the direct consumers of the good y are the ones who
pay the fixed costs via fixed fees. On the other side, when the median income is
higher than the average and the reservation fixed fee is high enough, the regulation in
democracy satisfies the definition of a Coasian solution. Furthermore, in this scenario,
both the regulation in democracy and the Coasian solution raises the same level of
aggregate welfare in terms of efficiency since the per-unit price equals the marginal
cost.
Notwithstanding, additional to have a preference for who pays the fixed costs
of providing the good y, a median income citizen chooses a lower pre-unit price the
lower is her income. And this price is always different from the marginal cost; except
in the case where the median income equals the average.
In the next proposition, I compare the total welfare that results from the regulatory
policy in democracy with the total welfare raised by the Coasian solution. I define
the total welfare of the society as the aggregate consumer surplus of all citizens. The
proposition shows there exists a welfare cost of using regulation as a redistributive
policy; regardless of the position of the median income (whether the median income
is below or above the average).
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Proposition 4 (Regulation as a redistributive policy: welfare costs). Whenever the
median income is different from the average income, regulation in democracy lowers the
aggregate consumer surplus of the society below the aggregate consumer surplus that results
from the Coasian solution.
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.B, proposition 1.8.B.3.
Proposition 4 shows that regulation under democracy is inefficient because the
majoritarian preference over the variable price of the regulated good almost always
differs from the efficient solution (which takes place when the variable price equals
the marginal cost). Intuitively, when the society is comprised of a majority of low
income citizens, there exist political incentives for transferring the burden of the costs
of regulated goods to the high income citizens through taxation; by reducing the
variable price and the fixed fee of those goods. Still, the source of inefficiency is
the distortion of the variable price and not the alteration of the fixed fee. A similar
inefficiency arises when the high income citizens are in majority and select a variable
price above the marginal cost.
1.6 Poverty and regulation
The consumption of public utilities like water and electricity is usually subsidised in
almost every country. The main claim for these subventions is that they improve the
well-being of the poor by facilitating their access and use of the utility services. It is
implicit in this claim that the consumption of utilities by the poor behaves differently
from that by the rest of the community; and even more, that the poor themselves can
be defined by their consumption behaviour.
The results on the relation between regulation and inequality do not capture
this particular consumption behaviour by the poor. This is a consequence of the
assumption for which all citizens in the society have incomes large enough to consume
strictly positive quantities of all types of goods (see definition 1).
Suppose instead that, for a given policy (py, t), there exist a number of citizens
with incomes small enough such that they consume only the monopolistic good.
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Then, starting from the indirect utility function,
ψ(py, t;ω j) =
1
4
p−1y +ω j(1− t) (1.12)
there exists an income threshold (the poverty line),
ω0(py, t) =
1
4
p−1y (1− t)−1, (1.13)
which divides the community in two groups. One group comprised of those citizens
with income above ω0(py, t), named the “rich” (R), who have preferences represented
by function 1.12. And the other, the group of citizens with income below ω0(py, t),
named “the poor” (P), who spend all the income on the monopolistic good. As a
consequence, group P’s preferences are represented by a different indirect utility
function given by,
ψ(py, t;ωP) =
(
(1− t)ωP
py
)1/2
(1.14)
The solution for the threshold in 1.13 is derived as follows. For those citizens who are
exactly at the threshold, the indirect utility function defined in 1.12 must equal the
one given by 1.14:
ψ(py, t;ω0) =
1
4
p−1y +ω0(1− t) =
(
(1− t)ω0
py
)1/2
(1.15)
Furthermore, for any citizen at the threshold, the quantity consumed of the regulated
good satisfies,
y∗0 =
(1− t)ω0
py
=
1
4
p−2y . (1.16)
Then, I replace this expression in the right-hand side of equation 1.15 to obtain the
closed-form of the income threshold in 1.13.
The assumption that the poor are better characterised by the bundle they consume
than by their actual income has two relevant implications. First, the regulatory policy
affects not only the well-being of the citizens in P and R in different ways, but also
the size of these groups. Since a change in the policy shifts the income threshold.
Second, the main characteristic of the society that determines the regulatory policy is
the relative number of the poor rather than the level of income inequality.
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Following this argument, the next proposition proves a negative (positive) relation
between the price of the monopolistic good (the tax rate) and the number of the poor.
Proposition 5 (Poverty and regulation in democracy). Suppose there exists an equilib-
rium where the policy (p∗y, t∗) is such that the income threshold is below the median income
(ω0(p∗y, t∗) < ωm). Then, regardless the location of the average income, the price of the
monopolistic good py (the tax rate t) is decreasing (increasing) in the size of the poor group P.
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.C, proposition 1.8.C.1.
Proposition 5 shows that the price of the regulated good is decreasing in the
number of citizens that are poor. This result captures the political incentives to benefit
the poor though the provision of low-price public utilities; since for the poor the
utilities are essential in their consumption bundle. Furthermore, this result does
not depend on the distance between the median and the average incomes; and as a
consequence, it is not linked to inequality.
1.7 Conclusions
Much of the literature has approached regulation from the perspective of the agency
problems that emerge between the regulator and the firms. In contrast, in this paper I
emphasise the fact that regulation has distributive effects on the society, and therefore,
political incentives must be considered.
I develop a model of regulation of a monopolistic firm that shows the conditions
under which a median income citizen sets a price of the monopolistic good different
from the efficiency benchmark provided by the central planner’s solution. I show
that an asymmetric distribution of income in the society endows the median income
citizen with the ability of transferring the cost of providing the monopolistic good to
the average income citizen; reducing the aggregate consumer surplus of the society.
This welfare loss of regulation in democracy is also present when the regulatory
policy consists of a two-part tariff.
The main result of the paper states that when the consumption of the monopolistic
good is essential for the poor citizens (as in the case of the consumption of water,
gas or electricity), the relevant characteristic of the society that explains regulation
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in a democracy is the poverty rate rather than inequality. In the context of my
model, which considers one type of redistributive policy, poverty and inequality
are highly correlated. However, the paper still captures the shift from inequality to
poverty; which is expected to be even more relevant when the society must choose
the combination of two or more redistributive policies (including regulation). In such
a case, the society is divided in groups, each with different preferences over the mix
of the multiple types of policy, and therefore, the median income solution fails to exist.
This feature opens ahead a line of research exploring the choice in democracies of the
combination of regulation with other redistributive policies; which can be studied
within a citizen-candidate9 framework.
9See Besley and Coate, 1997a and Osborne and Slivinski, 1996.
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1.8 Appendices
1.8.A Price-tax regulation
The unregulated monopolist
I consider the case of an unregulated monopolist as a benchmark for the main results
of the paper. In particular, for all the results in a democracy I assume that all the
elements in the feasible set of regulatory prices are below the monopoly price pM(θ).
In order the characterise pM(θ), I normalize the price px = 1, the marginal cost of x,
ρ = 1; and I give to the non-linear component of the citizens’ utility functions the
functional form v(·) = √· . In addition, based on definition 1, I assume there are no
poor in the society; i.e., ω− ≥ 14 p−1y . As a result, the production costs of the goods x
and y are C(x) = x and C(y) = θy+ K.
The aggregate demand for good x, x =
∫ 1
0 xj(1, py;ω
j) f (ω j)dj, is the residual of all
the income that is not spent on good y.
In turn, the quantity of y, y =
∫ 1
0 yj(1, py) f (ω
j)dj = y(1, py) produced by an un-
regulated monopolist is such that the marginal revenue equals the marginal costs,
1
4 (y)
−1/2 = θ. As a result, under the case of an unregulated monopolist, the solution
for the vector (x∗, p∗y, y∗) is given by,
x∗ =
∫ 1
0
ω j f (ω j)dj− 1
8
θ−1
p∗y = 2θ
y∗ =
1
16
θ−2
(1.17)
Proposition 18A1 (The regulatory policy by a central planner). A benevolent central
planner chooses a variable price,
pcpy =
(
2β
1+ β
)
θ (1.18)
which satisfies,
(a) pcpy is increasing in the central planner’s value of the profits;
(b) limβ→1− p
cp
y = θ;
(c) limβ→0+ p
cp
y = pLy ;
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with pLy =
1−√1−16Kθ+16tLωθ
8(K−tLω) and t
L =
√
7
√
7ω2−240θkω2+120θkω−7ω
225θω2 .
Proof. I first prove Part (a) and Part (b). The program of the central planner is given
by,
Max
py,t
CS(py, t) + βΠ(py, t)
s.t. Π(py, t) ≥ 0.
In order to derive the expression for the consumers’ surplus CS(py, t), I start from
the indirect utility function,
ψ(1, py,ω j) =
1
4
p−1y +ω j = κ(py) +ω j (1.19)
where the generic form of κ(·) is κ(py) = v(y(1, py))− pyy(1, py); and for the case of
v(·) = √·, κ(py) = 14 p−1y . Next, by the Roy’s identity, I obtain the demand for good y
as y(1, py) = −κ′(py) = 14 p−2y . Then, the consumer surplus of citizen j results from
the integration of the demand over the price plus the after-tax income as follows,
CSj =
∫ ∞
py
1
4
s−2ds + (1− t)ω j
As a last step to obtain an expression for the aggregate consumer surplus I integrate
over the citizens using two facts; the demand for y does not depend on the income;
and the community is of a unit mass of citizens,
CS =
∫ 1
0
CSj f (ω j)dj =
∫ 1
0
[ ∫ ∞
py
1
4
s−2ds + (1− t)ω j
]
f (ω j)dj
=
∫ ∞
py
1
4
s−2ds + (1− t)
∫ 1
0
ω j f (ω j)dj
Therefore, including the definition of the after-subsidy profits, the extensive form of
the central planner’s program is,
Max
py,t
∫ ∞
py
1
4
s−2ds + (1− t)
∫ 1
0
ω j f (ω j)dj
+ β
[
(py − θ)14 p
−2
y − K + t
∫ 1
0
ω j f (ω j)dj
]
s.t. (py − θ)14 p
−2
y − K + t
∫ 1
0
ω j f (ω j)dj ≥ 0.
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In order to derive the first order conditions, I first work on the improper integral
term, ∫ ∞
py
1
4
s−2ds =
1
4
[ ∫ c
py
s−2ds +
∫ ∞
c
s−2ds
]
=
1
4
[
−
∫ py
c
s−2ds + lim
b→∞
∫ b
c
s−2ds
]
=
1
4
[
−
∫ py
c
s−2ds + lim
b→∞
(
− 1
b
+
1
c
)]
=
1
4
[
−
∫ py
c
s−2ds +
1
c
]
Then, by the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus (FTC), the derivative of CS w.r.t py is,
∂CS
∂py
= −1
4
p−2y (1.20)
Second, I take the derivative of Π(py, t) w.r.t. py,
∂Π
∂py
=
1
4
(2θp−3y − p−2y ) (1.21)
From equations 1.20 and 1.21, the first order condition over py is given by,
∂CSx,y
∂py
+ β
∂Πy
∂py
= −1
4
p−2y + β
1
4
(2θp−3y − p−2y ) = 0
⇐⇒ pcpy =
(
2β
1+ β
)
θ.
(1.22)
From equation 1.22, it is straightforward showing that pcpy is increasing in β. Further-
more, the second order condition ddpy
(
∂CS
∂py + β
∂Π
∂py
)
< 0 is satisfied for py <
(
3β
1+β
)
θ
which includes pcpy . Lastly, the limit of p
cp
y when the weight to the profits goes to one
equals the marginal cost; limβ→1− p
cp
y = θ.
Part (c).
For any price below the monopoly price (py < 2θ), the smaller the price py the lower
the profits Π. And therefore, the higher the amount of taxes required to satisfy
the constraint of zero after-subsidy profits. However, the feasible amount of taxes
collected has an upper limit given by the total aggregate income of the community
ω =
∫ 1
0 ω
j f (ω j)dj. As a consequence, the limβ→0+ p
cp
y has a value that is different
from zero. The logic is as follows. I first solve for the minimum price such that the
1.8. Appendices 23
constraint (py − θ) 14 p−2y − K + tω = 0 is satisfied,
Min
t
pLy =
1−√1− 16Kθ + 16tωθ
8(K− tω) (1.23)
Then, the tax rate that minimises py is,
tL =
√
7
√
7ω2 − 240θkω2 + 120θkω− 7ω
225θω2
(1.24)
And the corresponding minimum price pLy ,
pLy =
1−√1− 16Kθ + 16tLωθ
8(K− tLω) (1.25)
Corollary 18A2 (Negative before-subsidy profits). Suppose θ > 0. Then, all β ∈ (0, 1)
choose a strictly positive subsidy. Furthermore, as β→ 1, the tax rate approximates to the
ratio of the fixed costs to the total income.
Proof. I first replace pcpy in the before-subsidy profits Πbsy ,
Πbs =
1
4
(pcpy − θ)(pcpy )−2 − K = 14
[(
2βθ
1+ β
)
− θ
](
2βθ
1+ β
)−2
− K (1.26)
Then, Πbs < 0 ⇐⇒ β <
(
1+4Kθ−1
1−4Kθ−1
)
≡ β. Since β > 1 for all θ > 0; Πbs < 0 for
all β ∈ (0, 1). And therefore, the subsidy required to satisfy the zero after-subsidy
constraint is positive.
Furthermore, the total subsidy is given by,
tcpω = −Πbs (1.27)
Then, taking the limit of 1.26 when β tends to one, limβ→1− Πbs = −K. As a result,
limβ→1− tcp = Kω .
Lemma 18A3 (Median income regulation). Suppose that each of the citizens inV casts
one vote for candidate l or r based on the candidates’ announced platforms. Then, if the
winner is elected by simple majority,
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(a) for any t ∈ [0, 1] and every price below the monopoly price (py ≤ 2θ), the citizens’
preferences are over a one-dimensional policy space;
(b) the citizens’ preferences are represented by single-peaked utility functions;
(c) both l and r announce the platform that maximises the utility function of the median
income citizen.
Proof. I first prove Part (a). The program of a generic citizen k ∈ V is given by,
Max
py,t
ψ(py, t;ωk) =
1
4
p−1y +ωk(1− t)
s.t. Π = (py − θ)14 p
−2
y − K + t
∫ 1
0
ω j f (ω j)dj ≥ 0
(1.28)
The program in 1.28 is over a one-dimensional policy space. The logic is as follows.
The indirect utility function of every citizen inV is monotonically decreasing in both
the price and the linear tax rate. As a consequence, for the sub-domain in which the
constraint is monotonically increasing in both the price and the tax rate, the constraint
is binding. And therefore, a value of one variable fully determines the value of the
other.
The logic of this argument is as follows. First, it is straightforward noticing that the
indirect utility functions are decreasing in both elements of the policy for the partial
derivatives of ψ w.r.t. py and t, are negative over the entire domains of py and t;
( ∂ψ∂py ,
∂ψ
∂t < 0). Second, the constraint is binding when it is increasing in both py and
t. To prove this claim, I begin by supposing the constraint is not binding; and the
pair (p∗y, t∗) is a solution of the program 1.28. In addition, I name the average income
ω =
∫ 1
0 ω
j f (ω j)dj. Then, there exists a ∆ > 0 such that for p∗y and t∗ − ∆,
Π = (p∗y − θ)
1
4
(p∗y)−2 − K + (t∗ − ∆)ω = 0, and
ψ(p∗y, t∗ − ∆;ωk) > ψ(p∗y, t∗;ωk)
Therefore, (p∗y , t∗) cannot be a solution of program 1.28. By analogous argument,
whenever the profits are increasing in py ( ∂Π∂py > 0); which happens for every price
below the monopoly price (py ≤ 2θ), a binding constraint is preferred to a non-
binding one. That is to say that for every pair (p∗y, t∗) such that Π(p∗y, t∗) > 0, there
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exists a ∆ > 0 such that,
Π = [(p∗y − ∆)− θ]
1
4
(p∗y − ∆)−2 − K + t∗ω = 0, and
ψ(p∗y − ∆, t∗;ωk) > ψ(p∗y, t∗;ωk)
Hence, (p∗y , t∗) cannot be a solution of program 1.28. Then, for any t ∈ (0, 1) and
py ≤ 2θ, any solution of the program 1.28 requires a binding constraint. As a result,
all citizens decide over a one-dimensional policy space.
Part (b).
The utility functions of the citizens are single-peaked. From Part (a), any pair (py, t)
that solves program 1.28 result in a binding constraint. Therefore, I clear t from the
constraint and replace it in the indirect utility function to obtain,
ψ(py;ωk) =
1
4
p−1y +
ωk
ω
[
1− K + 1
4
(p−1y − θp−2y )
]
(1.29)
In order to prove that the utility function 1.29 is single-peaked, I first define single-
peakedness (Myerson, 2013) as follows. The function ψ : R+ → R satisfies the
Single-peaked condition in py if for any two policies p
′
y and py and an ideal point pky; if
pky ≤ p′y < py or py < p′y ≤ pky, then ψ(p′y;ωk) > ψ(py;ωk).
A sufficient condition for the function 1.29 to satisfy single-peakedness is that the
function is unimodal with respect to its maximum. In order to show unimodality, I
first define the sub-domain where the first derivative is negative,
dψ
dpy
= −1
4
p−2y +
ωk
ω
1
4
(
θ2p−3y − p−2y
)
< 0 (1.30)
Then, the first derivative is negative if and only if,
py >
(
ω
ωm
+ 1
)−1
2θ = pky (1.31)
Analogously, the derivative is positive if and only if,
py <
(
ω
ωm
+ 1
)−1
2θ = pky (1.32)
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Therefore, by unimodality, the utility function 1.29 has a unique maximum at pky.
Lastly, I provide the second order condition for a maximum,
d2ψ
dp2y
(pky) =
1
2
pk−3y +
1
4
ωk
ω
(
2pk−3 − 6θpk−4
)
< 0 (1.33)
Condition 1.33 is satisfied when ωk > −ω, which is always true.
Part (c).
It follows from Part (a) and Part (b), by the Median Voter Theorem (Black, 1948).
Proposition 18A4 (Income distribution and the regulatory policy). The pair (pmy , tm)
which maximises the utility of the median income citizen is unique and satisfies,
(a) pmy =
(
ω
ωm + 1
)−1
2θ;
(b) tm = 1ω
[
K− 18θ−1
(
( ωωm + 1)− 12
(
ω
ωm + 1
)2)];
(c) if the median income is below the average income (ωm < ω), then the price is below the
marginal cost (pmy < θ). In contrast, if ωm > (=)ω, then pmy > (=) θ.
Proof. Part (a). pmy =
(
ω
ωm + 1
)−1
2θ follows straight from the proof of lemma 1.8.A.3.
Part (b).
Since the non-negative profits constraint is binding, I replace the median income
value for the price (pmy ) in the constraint and clear tm; which results in,
tm =
1
ω
[
K− 1
8
θ−1
(
(
ω
ωm
+ 1)− 1
2
( ω
ωm
+ 1
)2)] (1.34)
In order to prove uniqueness, I assume that for the same average income (ω) there
exist two different income levels ωa and ωb such that equation 1.34 is satisfied. Then,
it must be that,
K− 1
8
θ−1
(
(
ω
ωa
+ 1)− 1
2
( ω
ωa
+ 1
)2)
= K− 1
8
θ−1
(
(
ω
ωb
+ 1)− 1
2
( ω
ωb
+ 1
)2)
1
ωa
+
ω
(ωa)2
=
1
ωb
+
ω
(ωb)2
This equation has two solutions; (1) ωa = ωb and (2) ωa = − ωωb
ωb+ω
. However,
solution (2) implies ωa < 0 for any ωb > 0; which is impossible for a variable that
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represents an income level. And therefore, for a given value of pmy , there exists a
unique tm.
Part (c).
The median income price pmy is higher (equal or lower) than the marginal cost θ if and
only if, (
ω
ωm
+ 1
)−1
2θ T θ ⇐⇒ 1 T ω
ωm
⇐⇒ ωm T ω.
1.8.B Two-part tariff regulation
Lemma 18B1 (Median income solution for two-part tariff and taxation). The citizens’
indirect utility functions over the triple (py, F, t) satisfy the intermediate preferences condi-
tion; i.e., citizens have only one characteristic (their income) and the indirect utility function
is monotone on this characteristic. Then, a unique Condorcet winner exists and coincides
with the policy that is most preferred by the median income citizen.
Proof. Under two-part tariff, the preferences of generic citizen k are represented by
the program,
Max
F,t
ψ(py, F, t;ωk) =
1
4
p−1y − F +ωk(1− t)
s.t. (py − θ)14 p
−2
y + F− K + tω = 0
(1.35)
Since the constraint is binding, I clear the value of t in the constraint and replace it in
the indirect utility function as follows,
ψ(py, t;ωk) = (py − θ)14 (py)
−2 +
1
4
(py)−1 − K +ωt + (1− t)ωk (1.36)
As the indirect utility function in 1.36 is linear in income, it satisfies the definition of
intermediate preferences,
ψ(py, t;ωk) = α(py, t) + φ(ωk)γ(py, t) ; with,
α(py, t) = (py − θ)14 (py)
−2 +
1
4
(py)−1 − K +ωt ;
γ(py, t) = 1− t ; and,
φ(ωk) = ωk, monotonic in ωk.
(1.37)
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Then, by Grandmont, 1978, a Condorcet winner exists and coincides with the policy
that is most preferred by the median income citizen.
Proposition 18B2 (Income distribution and the choice between tax and fixed fee).
For a given per-unit price py, the reservation fixed fee for all the citizens in V is given by
FR = 14 p
−1
y . Furthermore, the median voter pair (F
m, tm) depends on the position of the
median income (ωm) relative to the average income (ω) as follows,
(a) when ωm > ω,
(Fm, tm) =

(
FR,
−Πbs − FR
ω
)
i f FR < −Πbs
(−Πbs, 0) i f FR ≥ −Πbs;
(b) when ωm < ω,
(Fm, tm) = (0,
−Πbs
ω
); (1.38)
(c) when ωm = ω,
{
(Fm, tm) ∈ [0, FR]× [0, 1] | tm = −Π
bs − Fm
ω
}
; (1.39)
where Πbs = 14 (py − θ)(py)−2 − K is the value of the before-subsidy profits.
Proof. I first derive the reservation fixed fee FR. Any citizen k ∈ V will consume a
positive quantity of good y iff the utility of consuming y is greater or equal than the
utility of spending all the income on good x,
1
4
p−1y − F +ωk(1− t) ≥ ωk(1− t)
1
4
p−1y ≥ F
(1.40)
Therefore, the reservation value of the fixed fee is FR = 14 p
−1
y ; and since it does not
depend on the income, it is the same for all citizens.
Part (a).
I start with the indirect utility function in 1.36. For a given py,
ψ(t;ωm | py) = Γ(py) +ωm − K + (ω−ωm)t (1.41)
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with Γ(py) ≡ (py − θ) 14 (py)−2 + 14 (py)−1 . The indirect utility function 1.41 is linear
in t with the coefficient given by (ω − ωm). As a consequence, when ωm > ω, the
indirect utility function is decreasing in t. And then, 1.41 is maximised when t is at
its minimum. The minimum t is zero when the reservation fixed fee FR is greater or
equal the before-subsidy profits (FR ≥ −Πbs); and equals −Πbs−FRω if FR < −Πbs.
Part (b).
Instead, when ωm < ω, the indirect utility function is increasing in t. And therefore,
1.41 is maximised when t is at its maximum −Πbsω and the fixed fee at zero (F = 0).
Part (c).
When ωm = ω, the indirect utility function 1.41 does not depend on t; and therefore,
the median income citizen is indifferent among all the pairs (F, t) such that tmω +
Fm = −Πbs.
Proposition 18B3 (Regulation as a redistributive policy: welfare costs). Whenever
the median income is different from the average income, regulation in democracy lowers the
aggregate consumer surplus of the society below the aggregate consumer surplus that results
from the Coasian solution.
Proof. I begin by defining the consumer surplus of the average income citizen under
the Coasian solution for which (pcy, Fc, tc) = (θ, K, 0),
CSc(ω) =
∫ ∞
θ
1
4
s−2ds +ω− K.
Next, I consider the consumer surplus of the average income citizen under democracy
when ωm > ω; where the policy is (pm>y , Fm>, tm>) = (pm>,−Πb fm>, 0),
CSm>(ω) =
∫ ∞
pm>
1
4
s−2ds +ω+Πb fm>.
Since −Πb fm> = K− (pm> − θ) 14 pm>−2,
CSm>(ω) =
∫ ∞
pm>
1
4
s−2ds +ω− K + (pm> − θ)1
4
pm>−2.
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Therefore, CSc(ω) > CSm>(ω) iff,
∫ pm>
θ
1
4
s−2ds > (pm> − θ)1
4
pm>−2
⇐⇒
2θpm> < θ + pm>
which is true for every θ 6= pm>, pm> 6= 0, and θ 6= 0.
Now, I consider the consumer surplus of the average income citizen under democracy
when ωm < ω; where the policy is (pm<y , Fm<, tm<) = (pm<, 0,
−Πb fm<
ω ),
CSm<(ω) =
∫ ∞
pm<
1
4
s−2ds +ω(1+
Πb fm<
ω
).
Since Πb fm< = −K + (pm< − θ) 14 pm<−2,
CSm<(ω) =
∫ ∞
pm<
1
4
s−2ds +ω− K + (pm< − θ)1
4
pm<−2.
Therefore, CSc(ω) > CSm<(ω) iff,
∫ θ
pm<
1
4
s−2ds < −(pm< − θ)1
4
pm<−2
⇐⇒
2θpm< < θ + pm<
which is true for every θ 6= pm<, pm< 6= 0, and θ 6= 0. Furthermore, it is straightfor-
ward noticing that CSc(ω) = CSm=(ω) when ω = ωm.
1.8.C The poor and the rich
Proposition 18C1 (Poverty and regulation in democracy). Suppose there exists an
equilibrium where the policy (p∗y, t∗) is such that the income threshold is below the median
income (ω0(p∗y, t∗) < ωm). Then, regardless the location of the average income, the price
of the monopolistic good py (the tax rate t) is decreasing (increasing) in the size of the poor
group P.
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Proof. I begin with an equilibrium where candidates l and r announce the policy
(p∗y, t∗). Then, exactly at the threshold,
1
4
p∗−1y +ω0(1− t∗) =
(
(1− t∗)ω0
p∗y
)1/2
Now suppose that the number of the poor increases as F1(ω0(·)) > F0(ω0(·)). After
this change in the distribution, both candidates have an incentive to change the policy
towards the preferences of the poor; and therefore, (p∗y, t∗) cannot be an equilibrium
any more. In order to restore the equilibrium, the candidates must change the policy
in order to increase the utility of the poor as follows,
∂ψ(py, t;ωP)
∂py
= −1
2
(
(1− t)ω0
py
)−1/2
(1− t)ω0
p2y
< 0
Therefore, the price p∗y is decreasing in the size of the poor group F
(
ω0(·)). Further-
more, since the constraint is binding, t∗ is increasing in F
(
ω0(·)).
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Chapter 2
The Role of Campaign
Contributions and Private Interests
in Regulation
2.1 Introduction
Regulation takes place in a political environment where elections are not only mech-
anisms for selecting policymakers but also potential sources of rents in office; and
these rents are mostly determined by the connections between candidates and special
interests. This feature explains why corporations devote costly efforts to gain access
to candidates before elections. Moreover, these pre-electoral attempts take many
forms and frequently result in a welfare loss.
Most commonly, special interest groups have access to candidates before elections
via campaign contributions. Such contributions consist in funds raised to promote
candidates and finance political parties’ electoral activities.
Relatively absent in the literature, I focus on the purpose of communication of
the campaign funding paid to candidates by a monopolistic firm that operates in a
regulated industry. Specifically, I assume the firm offers a transfer of a fixed amount
to the candidates not only before elections but even before the candidates announce
their platforms. Furthermore, I consider popularity is exogenous; and therefore,
once the funding is received, the electoral incentives of the candidates prevail. As a
consequence, they are not the campaign contributions that enhance popularity, but
the popularity determines the feasibility of using campaign contributions to transmit
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private information.
I find that in almost every equilibrium the monopolistic firm effectively transmits
relevant private information. To see why, consider the following situation. The
firm offers zero contribution to the candidates; and the candidates, based on their
prior beliefs, announce their platforms in order to maximise the chances of winning
the elections. Then, if the firm is one with high costs and based on the announced
platform incurs losses, it has an incentive to offer campaign contributions to signal its
type. The extent to which this signal is influential depends on the relative popularity
of the candidates. Since only a candidate with a popularity advantage has the room
to respond to the signal by adjusting the policy while still keeping plurality.
This result departs from the traditional approach which considers that campaign
contributions are relevant because, on one side, they allow politicians to increase
their relative popularity. And on the other side, they give special interest groups
policy favours in return. The traditional approach stresses this mutually beneficial
exchange, by assuming that campaign contributions take place after the candidates
announce their platforms. And as popularity is endogenous, special interests focus
their funding on boosting the probability of wining of their most preferred candidate.
In contrast, in this chapter I consider that the funding of campaign activities is a
mechanism to communicate relevant characteristics of the regulated industry, before
the announcement of the platforms.
It is this role of communication of campaign contributions that provides a rationale
for permitting interest groups to fund pre-electoral political activity. As an illustration,
consider the case of the Political Action Committees (PAC) in the United States. These
are organisations that pool contributions from their members and donate those funds
to campaign for or against certain candidates.1 Over 1,500 corporations are members
of PACs, including many Fortune 500 companies as well as numerous small to mid-
sized companies. Furthermore, this sample includes several firms operating in highly
regulated industries such as Telecommunications. In fact, the more the business is
regulated, the more it is affected by decisions that elected officials make at all levels.
And therefore, corporations see in the PAC a tool that provides their executives with
1See Quealy and Willis, 2012.
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the opportunity and ability to inform elected officials on important issues of their
business.
In this chapter, I consider the offer of a share in the business under regulation as
another instrument that enables the monopolistic firm to access the candidates before
elections. More generally, the involvement of private interests at all levels of politics
is not unusual. For instance, there is evidence that the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has responded to interest groups in allocating its resources.
In fact, the involvement of liable parties and local communities has appeared to
have considerable influence in the agency’s decision making. On one side, sites
where liable parties hold extensive financial wealth or resources have showed slower
clean-up processes conducted by EPA. On the other side, powerful communities have
managed to expedite the progress of EPA activities.2
As for the specific mechanism used by government officials and private interests
to share the profits of a regulated business, the “notebooks” scandal of corruption
in Argentina provides a clear example. The scandal started at the beginning of 2018
when an Argentina’s daily newspaper got copies of handwritten notebooks with
journals of the driver of a senior government official; who was in charge of ties with
construction companies during the governments of Néstor and Cristina Kirchner.
The executives of the companies involved in the scandal, who testified as protected
witnesses, stated that they had agreed to overprice the public works for then returning
in cash 15% of the illegal profits to public officials.
In my model, the involvement of private interests before elections is represented
by a monopolistic firm that offers a share of its (expected) profits to the candidates.
Through this offer, the firm seeks to align candidates’ incentives by linking the value
of their rents in office to the policy platform. Once more, the degree to which the
access to the candidates alters the regulatory policy relies on the popularity advantage
by one of the candidates. When this advantage does exist, the most popular candidate
sets a platform that puts her rival in the situation of a “zero-rent or non-plurality
trap”; only by adjusting the policy towards voters’ preferences, the competitor would
be able to win the elections, but at the cost of gaining zero rents in office. As a result,
the most popular candidate has the ability to announce a policy for which both herself
2See Sigman, 2001.
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and the firm get positive rents; and this happens at the expense of the voters’ welfare.
Furthermore, the resulting policy does not depend on the private information of
the monopolistic firm; and the actual share of the profits is determined through a
bargaining process between the firm and the candidate.
This outcome flags the potential benefits of the laws that prevent public officials
from participating in public matters in which they hold private interests. In most
countries, these laws exist and regulate the conflict of interests between officials’
personal business and their public duties. Even so, detecting and monitoring conflict
of interests is costly and relies on officials that in turn have their own private interests.
To deal with this problem, the regulations on conflict of interests have advanced
towards more enforceable mechanisms. For example, in the United States the Ethics
in Government Act defines and recognizes the “qualified blind trust”, a tool for
managing officials’ private business in which the public officer has no knowledge of
her holdings of the trust, and no right to intervene in their handling. Nonetheless,
this regulation excludes the president; and for many other offices, it is not mandatory.
The relevance of the paper in the context of the related literature is assessed in
Section 2.2. Section 2.3 lays out the model and explains the differences in the trade-
offs that candidates face under campaign contributions and private interests. Section
2.4 characterises the solutions for the electoral competition; and explores the effect of
candidates’ popularity on the regulatory policy. Section 2.5 provides the conditions
for which the firm effectively transmits private information; and describes the effect
of the involvement of private interests in the regulatory policy. This section contains
the main results of the paper. Section 2.6 concludes. Appendices 2.7.A and 2.7.B
contain all the proofs.
2.2 Related Literature
In this paper, I build on the probabilistic voting model (Coughlin, 1992, Lindbeck
and Weibull, 1987, and Enelow and Hinich, 1989) to examine the effect of campaign
contributions and private interests on the regulation of a monopoly with unknown
costs.
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The dominant approach to study the regulatory policy of a monopolistic firm
with private information is via principal-agent models. The principal is a social
welfare maximiser who either directly designs an incentive compatible price-subsidy
mechanism for the firm to reveal its costs (Baron and Myerson, 1982 and Laffont
and Tirole, 1986); or delegates this task to a regulatory agency (Laffont and Tirole,
1991b). Also in the context of hierachical models, Baron, 1988 studies the electoral
incentives of a legislature that by majority rule chooses the mandate of a regulatory
agency. Then, this agency faithfully regulates a firm with private information. I
depart from the principal-agent approach because it fails to capture the effect that the
electoral incentives of both opportunistic politicians and private interests have on the
regulatory process.
My paper is closer to the literature on the involvement of special interest groups in
elections; in particular, the studies on campaign contributions (Austen-Smith, 1987,
Hillman and Ursprung, 1988, Magee, Brock, and Young, 1989, Dixit and Londregan,
1996, and Stokes, 2005). In these papers, campaign funding enhances candidates’
popularity; and therefore, candidates face the problem of which group to target at
the moment of announcing the policy favours. As a result, the most decisive special
interest groups benefit the most from the policy platforms. For instance, Baron, 1994
defines a polity with both informed and non-informed voters. Then, candidates
raise contributions for their campaigns by favouring interests groups; and use these
funds to influence the non-informed voters. The paper captures the trade-off between
choosing a policy to generate funds to influence the uninformed vote and choosing a
policy to attract the informed vote.
A similar framework has been used to study regulation. For instance, Moita
and Paiva, 2013 introduce uncertainty about the type of the politician; in particular,
whether she is purely opportunistic or she cares about the social welfare. In this
context, Moita and Paiva study the impact of the campaign contributions delivered
by producers on the regulated price.
The literature on special interests enquires about which groups are more able
to influence the public policy. Consequently, the effect of campaign funding on
candidates’ popularity explains how the activity of special groups before elections
aligns the incentives of politicians and private interests. In this line, most of the
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papers in the literature share the same general logic as follows. Candidates have
electoral incentives. As a consequence, campaign contributions are valuable to the
extent they boost candidates’ popularity; and the policy platforms are the mean to
compensate the interest groups for their funding.
In contrast to the literature on special interests, in this chapter I ask how the
pre-electoral connection between the candidates and the firm affects the regulatory
policy and its efficiency. I assume candidates care about contributions (and also about
the policy) only to the extent that they affect the value of the rents in office. And
it is the candidates’ popularity that determines the identity of the receiver of the
contributions and her capacity for altering the policy; and not the campaign funding
that enhances popularity. This setting is more suitable to explore the use of campaign
contributions as tools to communicate private information. In this sense, the most
closely related paper is Austen-Smith, 1993 (similarly Austen-Smith, 1995).
Austen-Smith models a legislative policy-making process where an interest group
acquires policy-relevant information, and has access to legislators at both the agenda
setting stage and the vote stage. In this way, lobbying is seen as a problem of strategic
information transmission where legislators cannot observe whether the interest group
actually becomes informed or not. He shows that effective communication exists
when the lobby acts at the agenda stage, but not at the voting stage. This environment
configures a cheap-talk situation; and therefore, for lobbying to be influential there
must exist some alignment between the preferences of the special interest and the
legislator. Here instead, campaign contributions are a costly signal device for the firm
to communicate private information to candidates, that are fully motivated by the
expected value of their rents in office. Importantly, it is the form that contributions
take what endogenously determines the incentives alignment between candidates
and the firm; and not the other way around.
Finally, to a lesser degree, this paper is related to the literature that studies
campaign funding as a mean for special interest to gain government contracts (see
for instance Witko, 2011).
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Nature
selects θ
Firm E
offers κ or γ
Candidates
announce
qL,qR
Voters cast
ballots bj
Winner
implements
her policy
Access to candidates Electoral stage
Figure 2.1: Sequence of events.
2.3 The Model
A communityV, of a unit mass of voters, elects one of the candidates L or R to imple-
ment a policy. Voters are identified by two characteristics, their income ω ∈ Ω ≡ R+
whose distribution is F(ω), and their ideological preference for the candidates. Once
in office, the elected candidate chooses the policy q ∈ Q which has two components,
a variable price p ∈ R+ of a good or service y, and a linear income tax rate t ∈ [0, 1].3
Voters’ ideologies are assumed orthogonal to the policy, and represented by the
positive real numbers Lj and Rj4, j ∈ V. In this way, each of the voter types receives
a different utility depending on which candidate is elected; and therefore, voters’
utilities are represented by the following function,
V(q, C; j) =

u(q, j) + Lj if C = L
u(q, j) + Rj if C = R
(2.1)
Candidates are assumed to know the function u but they only have a probability
distribution over the pairs (Lj, Rj). In particular, I assume that both candidates believe
Lj − Rj is distributed according to a probability measure whose function is Gj.
Lastly, I assume the good y is provided by a monopolistic firm E which has private
information of the production cost parameter θ. I assume θ follows a distribution with
density function µ(θ) and support in the set Θ ≡ [θ−, θ+] ⊂ R, where 0 ≤ θ− ≤ θ+,
and θ+ is a finite number. The provision of y yields profitsΠ(q, θ), withΠ decreasing
in θ and increasing in the price p.
3I assume the policy space Q is a compact, convex set inR2. The tax component of the policy satisfies
this assumption since t ∈ [0, 1]. As for the price component, it is an element of R+ which satisfies the
least-upper-bound property; and therefore, for compactness it is required for p to have an upper bound.
I then assume the upper-bound for p is the monopoly price pM.
4Superscripts denote attributes while subscripts refer to choices.
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The sequence of events, depicted in Figure 2.1, is divided in two stages. The first,
named “access to candidates”, begins with the realization θ ∈ Θ of a random variable
θ˜ that is privately observed by the firm. Then, the firm can get access to the candidates
in two alternative ways. On one hand, the firm can offer a non-negative lump sum
transfer κ (campaign contribution) to one of the candidates. With the expected utility
of the candidate being κ times the probability of winning the election; and the firm’s
payoff being the profits minus κ, once more weighted by the chance of winning of
the candidate. On the other hand, the firm has the choice of offering a share of the
profits γ ∈ [0, 1] (private interests) to one of the candidates. If the chosen candidate is
R; then, her payoff depends on the updated beliefs about the firm costs as follows,
uR(qR, qL;γ) =

γΠ(qR, µ(θ|γ)) i f R wins the election
0 i f R loses
(2.2)
where µ(θ|γ) is the belief of candidate R about θ, posterior to the offer γ. In turn, the
payoff of the firm E is given by,
uE(qR, qL,γ; θ) =

Π(qR, θ)− γΠ(qR, µ(θ|γ)) i f R wins
Π(qL, µ(θ)) i f R loses
(2.3)
where Π(qL, µ(θ)) are the profits under the prior, since candidate L does not receive
any further information. Once the offers are closed, the game ends with the “electoral
stage”, where candidates present their enforceable and verifiable platforms (qL,qR),
and each of the voters sincerely casts a ballot bj, j ∈ V, for one of the candidates.
The winner is elected by simple majority, and once in office, she implements her
announced platform. In the case of a tie, each candidate wins with probability
one-half.
The solution concept is Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. The logic is as follows.
The firm E has private information of its costs and offers either a lump sum transfer
or a share of the profits (signals) to one of the candidates. The candidate who gets in
contact with the firm uses this information to update her prior (beliefs) on the firm
cost and announces a policy platform. As a result, this sequence of events configures
a signaling game.
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In the electoral stage, the voters cast ballots based on the identity of the candidates
and the platforms. In turn, candidates know the component of voters’ utilities that
depends on the policy (see function 2.1) but they only have a distribution of the
pairs (Lj, Rj). In this way, the electoral stage follows the probabilistic voting model
by Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987. Moreover, since the community is comprised of a
unit mass of citizens (voters are of an infinite number), the expected vote share of a
candidate is equal to the actual vote share. And as a consequence, the voting stage
is under certainty almost everywhere but when both candidates get one-half of the
vote.
2.4 Regulatory policy and candidates’ popularity
I begin by analysing the electoral stage that takes place after the firm gets access
to the candidates. The particular form that this access takes, determines the nature
of the candidates’ behaviour at elections. On one hand, if the firm gives campaign
contributions in the form of a lump sum transfer, the candidates cannot credibly
commit to propose a policy different than the one that maximises their vote share.
Then, knowing the candidates’ impossibility to elude the electoral incentives, why
would the firm incur in the cost of transferring funds to any of the candidates?
On the other hand, when the firm offers a portion of the expected profits, the
candidates face a trade-off between their vote share and the value of their rents
in office. How is this trade-off solved? In this section, I address these questions
within the model, by characterising the expected regulatory policy in equilibrium;
and showing how the policy is affected by the relative popularity of the candidates.
Suppose that, before elections, the firm transfers a fix amount κ to one of the
candidates. Since the candidates’ rents in office depends on their chance of winning,
they will announce the policy platforms that maximise their vote share subject to the
firm still providing the good y. To construct the vote share of each candidate, I start
with the voting behaviour. For any two policy platforms qR and qL, voter j will vote
for R when,
u(qR, j) + Rj > u(qL, j) + Lj, or
Lj − Rj < u(qR, j)− u(qL, j)
(2.4)
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And as the candidates believe that Lj − Rj are distributed according to the functions
Gj, j ∈ V, the vote share of candidate R is given by,
Φ(qR, qL) =
∫
j
Gj(u(qR, j)− u(qL, j))dF(j) (2.5)
where F(j) is an abbreviation for the income distribution F(ω j). Moreover, to define
the vote share of candidate L, I assume that the functions Gj’s are each symmetric;
that is to say that for all x and j, Gj(x) = 1 − Gj(−x). And symmetry of this
kind is a sufficient condition for the vote share of candidate L to be 1−Φ(qR, qL).
As a consequence, elections configure a strategic game with candidates seeking to
maximise their vote share. More precisely, R maximises Φ(qR, qL) while L minimises
Φ(qR, qL). In Lemma 2.7.A.1, (appendix 2.7.A), I provide a formal proof of existence
of equilibria at the electoral stage when, before elections, the firm gets access to the
candidates via campaign contributions.5
Given the programs of the candidates, the equilibria can be characterised in terms
of the expected profits of the monopolistic firm. The next proposition shows that
under campaign contributions, the electoral competition pushes both candidates
to announce zero-profit policies; and this happens because the voters’ utilities are
decreasing in both the price of the regulated good and the tax rate. Therefore, given
the policy of one candidate, the vote share of the other candidate is higher the lower
the price and the tax rate she announces.
The result of zero profits in equilibrium is driven by the assumption that the
candidates want to assure the provision of a positive quantity of the regulated good.
Even when arbitrary, the zero-profit result is without loss of generality. Under any
other different lower bound for the expected profits which makes certain that the
good is provided, the analysis remains the same as the zero-profit case. Furthermore,
this result is independent of the relative popularity of the candidates.
Proposition 6 (Electoral competition leads to zero expected profits). Under campaign
contributions, any equilibrium of the electoral stage satisfies,
(a) the expected profits of the monopolistic firm are zero; and,
5The proof shows the conditions for the concavity of the vote share functions; and it is an application
of the proof of existence by Enelow and Hinich, 1989 to the model I present in this chapter.
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(b) if candidates share the same beliefs about the firm’s costs, the equilibrium is unique and
symmetric.
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.A, proposition 2.7.A.2.
Proposition 6 is relevant since it conveys that under campaign contributions the
monopolistic firm can only earn strictly positive profits by convincingly inflating its
costs. In particular, the next corollary shows that the firm can potentially influence
the policy only by offering campaign contributions to the most popular candidate.
Formally, a candidate is said to be the most popular if she gets more vote whenever
she announces the same policy platform as her opponent.
Corollary 1 (Candidates’ popularity and campaign contributions). The monopolistic
firm can potentially alter the regulatory policy only by providing campaign contributions to
the most popular candidate.
The logic is as follows. Suppose that the monopolistic firm has to choose one
candidate to provide campaign funding with the purpose of altering the policy in its
favour. If the firm chooses the less popular candidate, any attempt in this direction
will be unsuccessful since the less popular candidate will lose the election with
certainty. Alternatively, when giving the contribution to the most popular candidate,
there is a priori room to change the policy in the firm’s favour with the candidate still
obtaining plurality.
2.4.1 Private interests and the value of rents in office
In this subsection, I characterise the electoral incentives of the candidates under the
involvement of private interests in regulation. In particular, I assume that before
elections, the monopolistic firm seeks to influence the regulatory policy by linking
the value of candidates’ rents in office to their platforms. I show that, once more, the
degree to which an access to the candidates of this kind alters the regulatory policy,
relies on the existence of a popularity advantage by one of the candidates.
Formally, suppose that before elections the monopolistic firm offers to the candi-
dates the shares γL and γR in [0, 1] of its (expected) profits. Then, the expected utility
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function of candidate R (and similarly for candidate L) is given by,
uR (qR, qL, ·) =

γRΠ(qR, ·) if Φ(qR, qL) > 12
1
2γRΠ(qR, ·) if Φ(qR, qL) = 12
0 if Φ(qR, qL) < 12
(2.6)
The expected utility function in equation 2.6 is discontinuous at qdR, defined as the
policy that gives candidate R exactly half of the vote (See figure 2.2)6. This feature is
potentially problematic since the candidates’ best responses may fail to ensure the
existence of an equilibrium.7 Notwithstanding, when the candidates’ utility functions
are considered together, they do satisfy a sufficient condition for the existence of an
equilibrium of the electoral stage. This condition is called “payoff security” and it is
satisfied due to the symmetry of the vote share functions, for which whenever the
utility of one candidate jumps down the utility of the competitor jumps up. In lemma
2.7.A.4 of appendix 2.7.A, I provide a proof of existence of a Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies for the case of discontinuous candidates’ payoffs; which applies the
framework provided by Reny, 1999.
To start the analysis of these equilibria, consider the simple case in which both
candidates are equally popular. In such a situation, the electoral competition pushes
the candidates to announce policy platforms that please the voters up to the point that
the expected profits are zero. If one of the candidates deviates by doing differently,
she will have zero chance of winning.
But what if one candidate is more popular than the other? In the sense that her
expected vote share is greater than one-half whenever both candidates announce the
same policy platform. The next proposition shows that when a popularity advantage
does exist, the most popular candidate sets a platform that puts her rival in the
situation of a “zero-rent or non-plurality trap”; only by adjusting the policy towards
voters’ preferences, the competitor would be able to win the elections, but at the cost
of gaining zero rents in office. As a result, the most popular candidate has the ability
6Taking advantage of the monotonicity of the profits, Figure 2.2 abuses of simplicity by depicting the
policy in one dimension.
7The jump down at Φ(qdR, qL) = 1/2 makes the payoff function in 2.6 non-upper-semicontinuous;
and as a consequence, the best-reponse correspondences may fail to have a closed graph and\or fail to
be non-empty. See Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, pp. 34-35.
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qR
uR(qR, qL) uR(Φ > 12 ) = γRΠ(qR)
qdR
uR(Φ = 12 ) =
1
2γRΠ(qR)
uR(Φ < 12 ) = 0
Figure 2.2: The expected utility of the candidate is discontinuous at qdR where
Φ(qdR, qL) = 1/2. A policy with a higher tax rate and a higher price increases
the value of the rents in office; and simultaneously, decreases the candidate’s
vote share.
to announce a policy for which she gets positive rents in office; and this happens at
the expense of the voters’ welfare. Since this policy involves a higher price and\or a
higher tax-rate, which are less preferred for all the voters.
Proposition 7 (Candidates’ popularity and private interests in regulation). Suppose
that one candidate is more popular that the other; i.e., Φ(q, q) 6= 1/2 for every q in Q; and the
shares of the profits γR and γL are strictly positive. Then, in any equilibrium of the electoral
stage,
(a) the most popular candidate obtains a vote share strictly higher than one-half;
(b) the expected profits are strictly positive; and,
(c) the most popular candidate sets a policy q∗ such that at Φ(q∗, ·) = 1/2, the expected
profits under the policy of her opponent are zero.
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.A, proposition 2.7.A.5.
Proposition 7 suggests that if the monopolistic firm must choose one of the
candidates to offer a share of the profits before elections, there is an incentive to opt
for the most popular one. In the next section, I formalize the strategic behaviour of
the monopolistic firm and the candidates before elections.
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2.5 Access to candidates and communication
In this section, I go a stage back in the course of events to study the effect on the
regulatory policy of the different ways for which the monopolistic firm gets access to
the candidates before elections. I begin by claiming that campaign contributions are
signals for the firm to transmit information about its costs; and assess the conditions
under which these signals are influential.
Formally, the sequence of events under campaign contributions is as follows. The
nature selects the value θ of the cost parameter from the set Θ ≡ [θ−, θ+]. Then, the
monopolistic firm E privately observes θ, and offers a transfer of a fixed amount κ > 0
either to candidate R or L. After receiving the offer, the chosen candidate updates
her beliefs about the expected cost Eµ(θ | κ), and announces her regulatory policy
platform to compete in elections.
For the monopolistic firm, choosing the less popular candidate to make an offer
is a weakly dominated strategy. The reason is as follows. By proposition 6, candi-
dates competing in elections announce (expected) zero-profit policy platforms; and
therefore, the monopolistic firm can only make a difference by effectively inflating
its costs. I suppose, w.l.o.g., that L is the less popular candidate. Then, if the firm
makes an offer κ > 0 to L; candidate R -the most popular- will set a policy qR such
that the profits conditional to the common prior are zero; Π(qL | Eµ(θ)) = 0. As a
consequence, for L to get more than one-half of the vote, she must set a policy qL
such that the profits under the prior are negative ( Π(qR | Eµ(θ)) < 0). Since voters
always prefer a lower price and a lower tax rate. In this way, the monopolistic firm
can never get a strictly higher payoff by offering a campaign contribution to L instead
of R. Therefore, in what follows, I assume the monopolistic firm gets access to the
most popular candidate.
The next proposition shows there exists a class of partially informative equilibria
where the monopolistic firm conveys relevant information about the costs.
Proposition 8 (Campaign contributions as informative signals about costs). Suppose
the monopolistic firm gets access to the most popular candidate via campaign contributions.
Then,
(a) There are no equilibria where the firm fully reveals its true costs.
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(b) No equilibria where all the cost-types offer the same amount survive the Intuitive
Criterion refinement.
(c) There exist one class of partially informative equilibria where all the cost-types in
each element of a partition of the set [θ−, θ+] offer the same amount of campaign
contributions.
Proof. See Appendix 2.7.B, proposition 2.7.B.1.
Proposition 8 characterises the existence of multiple equilibria; and this multi-
plicity is a result of the assumption for which the firm can adopt any type from the
continuous set [θ−, θ+]. Nonetheless, the equilibria are divided in classes, each having
a distinctive characteristic in terms of the amount of information that is effectively
transmitted. The logic is as follows. First, I examine a fully informative situation in
which each of the cost-types of the monopolistic firm offers a different amount of
campaign contribution. Then, the candidate adjusts her beliefs and announces the
zero-profit platform that corresponds to each type. This profile of strategies-beliefs
cannot be an equilibrium. Since there always exists an incentive for any type lower
than θ+ to deviate, by offering an amount associated with a higher cost-type.
Second, I consider a class of non-informative equilibria where all the cost-types
offer the same amount of campaign contributions. Such a situation can only be
sustained by the candidate’s beliefs that any amount that is different than the one in
equilibrium, is always offered by a cost-type that is below the cost expected under
the prior Eµ(θ). However, suppose that off the equilibrium path, the amount of
campaign contributions is high enough such that at the highest policy that still gives
plurality to the candidate, the payoff of the firm is zero. Then, the candidate should
understand that the offer has been sent by a cost-type above Eµ(θ), since every type
below is making positive profits in equilibrium. In this way, if the candidate updates
her beliefs accordingly, there always exists a cost-type who is facing negative profits
in equilibrium, and who has an incentive to deviate.
Midway between the fully informative case and the non-informative one, there
exists a situation where the set [θ−, θ+] is divided in groups (a partition); with each
group offering the same amount of campaign contributions. And where a group with
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a higher average cost-type offers a higher amount. Furthermore, incentive compati-
bility is guaranteed by the condition for which the cost-types at the boundaries of the
groups are indifferent between staying in the same group or moving to the next one.
This result is relevant since when negative profits entail the risk of the non-
provision of the regulated good, campaign contributions play the role of communi-
cating useful private information about the firm that lessens this risk. Again, this
outcome depends on the existence of a candidate with an advantage in terms of
popularity.
2.5.1 Private interests and voters’ welfare
In subsection 2.4.1, I showed that a candidate with a popularity advantage, who holds
a private interest in regulation, is able to bias the policy towards a situation where
the monopolistic firm gains positive expected profits. This ability creates incentives
for the firm to share the regulated business with the popular candidate.
Here, I consider the case where, before elections, the monopolistic firm gets access
to the most popular candidate by connecting the value of her rents in office to the
regulatory policy. I show that regardless of the verifiability of the firm costs, the
candidate has an incentive to announce the policy that maximises the expected profits
subject to maintaining plurality. Moreover, I show that the alignment of incentives
between the firm and the candidate always results in a welfare loss for the voters; and
that this loss is increasing in the relative popularity of the advantageous candidate.
Formally, the sequence of events starts with the monopolistic firm E observing
its cost-type θ and offering a share of the expected profits γ ∈ [0, 1] to one of the
candidates. Suppose the firm selects the most popular candidate. Then, the candidate
announces her policy platform in order to maximise the value of the rents in office.
The next proposition captures the incentive of the most popular candidate to set
a policy that maximises the profits while she still gets plurality. The proposition is
limited to the case where the policy is below the one comprised of the monopoly
price and the maximum tax rate. Under this condition, the firm has no incentive to
transmit information about its costs because the candidate will set the same policy
regardless of any further information. As a consequence, the actual share of the profits
will result from a bargaining process between the candidate and the monopolistic
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max {qR | Φ0(qR , qL) > 1/2}
max {qR | Φ1(qR , qL) > 1/2}
Φ0(q, q) Φ1(q, q)
Figure 2.3: Private interests in regulation. The regulatory policy as a func-
tion of the candidates’ popularity. A higher popularity relaxes the electoral
constraint allowing for a further increase in the policy and the value of rents
in office. For simplicity, the increasing section of the policy function is repre-
sented by a line.
firm. Nevertheless, if the highest possible policy under which the candidate still gets
plurality is in the sub-domain where the profits are decreasing in the policy, the firm
may have an incentive to reveal information about its costs. Since this information
can induce a lower policy that results in higher profits.
Proposition 9 (Aligment of incentives between the firm and the most popular candi-
date). Suppose R is the most popular candidate and the highest policy that gives her plurality
(max {qR | Φ(qR, qL) > 1/2}) is below q ≡ (p, t) = (pM(θ), 1). Then, for any share of
the profits γ ∈ (0, 1),
(a) The regulatory policy is given by,
q∗R ∈ argmax
qR∈Q
{Π(qR) | Φ(qR, qL) > 1/2} (2.7)
(b) If the profits are ex-post verifiable, the monopolist reveals its true cost-type θ and gains
(1− γ)Π(q∗R; θ); while candidate R gains γΠ(q∗R; θ).
(c) If the profits are not ex-post verifiable, the monopolistic firm and candidate R bargain
over the share of the profits.
(d) The regulatory policy q∗R is increasing in the popularity of candidate R.
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Proof. See Appendix 2.7.B, proposition 2.7.B.5.
Figure 2.3 depicts the positive relation between the regulatory policy and the
relative popularity of the advantageous candidate. A higher relative popularity
relaxes the electoral constraint; and as consequence, the maximum policy that still
gives plurality to the candidate increases.
Proposition 9 has a relevant corollary. The involvement of private interest in
regulation results in the highest possible policy subject to the electoral constraint of
the most popular candidate, and therefore, in the minimum possible welfare of the
voters given the identity of the winner. Since the voters’ utilities are monotonically
decreasing in the policy. Moreover, this loss is non-decreasing in the popularity of
the advantageous candidate. This outcome provides a rationale for the institutions
that prevent decision makers in government from participating in public matters in
which they hold private interests.
2.6 Conclusions
In democracies, regulation takes place in an electoral environment that affects both
the incentives of corporations operating in regulated industries and the expected
value of the rents in office of public decision makers. In this paper, I study the
electoral incentives in regulation by considering two different ways through which
regulated firms can get access to candidates before elections; campaign contributions
and private interest sharing.
The main results of the paper are two-fold. On one hand, campaign contributions
can play the role of signals that convey private information of companies operating
in regulated industries. This result takes place when both the firm and the candidate
share the interest in assuring the provision of the good under regulation. From this
point of view, there are benefits in permitting interest groups to fund candidates
before elections since the sustainability and efficiency of the business can be enhanced.
One example of a mechanism that allows for pre-electoral funding is given by the
Political Action Committees (PAC) in the United States.
On the other hand, the paper shows that when the monopolistic firm succeeds in
linking the rents in office to the regulatory policy, the outcome is always a welfare
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loss for the voters. This result relies on the existence of a popularity advantage by one
of the candidates. Since only a more popular candidate has the ability to modify the
policy in favour of the private interests while still assuring plurality. This scenario
provides a rationale for the institutions that regulate the participation of officials in
public matters in which they hold private interests.
Importantly, the connection between the two main results of the paper raises a
further conclusion. If campaign contributions are used to transmit private information
only when there exists an alignment between the special groups’ interests and the
public goals (in my model, assuring the provision of the regulated good). Then,
in any other situation where this alignment does not exist, campaign contributions
should be interpreted as a way of disguising the involvement of private interests in
the public policy (regulation), with the negative consequences on the voters’ welfare.
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2.7 Appendices
2.7.A Regulatory policy and elections
Lemma 27A1 (Existence of Nash equilibria at the electoral stage). Let
Φ(qR, qL) =
∫
j
Gj(u(qR, j)− u(qL, j))dF(j)
be the vote share of candidate R and let Gj(·) be symmetric. Then, if for all qL = (pL, tL)
evaluated at qR = (pR, tR),
(a) gj
′
(·)u2k + gj(·)ukk < 0, with k = pR, tR; and,
(b) gj(·)(upR pR utRtR − u2pRtR) > gj
′
(·)(2upR utR u2pRtR − (u2pR utRtR + u2tR u2pR pR));
there exists at least one Nash equilibrium in the electoral stage.
Proof. If the objective functions Φ and 1−Φ are concave in qR and qL respectively;
then, for the Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem, there exists at least one Nash equilibrium
at the electoral stage. Furthermore, by symmetry of the distributions Gj, if Φ is
concave in qR; then, 1−Φ is concave in qL. As a consequence, the proof of existence
only requires to give the conditions for the concavity of Φ. That is to say that
the Hessian matrix of Φ evaluated at qR for all qL satisfies two conditions. First,
ΦjpR pR < 0 and Φ
j
tRtR < 0; which is equivalent to condition (a) in the statement of the
lemma. Second, ΦjpR pRΦ
j
tRtR −Φ
j
pRtRΦ
j
tR pR ≥ 0; which is, by the Schwarz’s theorem,
equivalent to condition (b).
Proposition 27A2 (Electoral competition leads to zero expected profits). Under cam-
paign contributions, any equilibrium of the electoral stage satisfies,
(a) the expected profits of the monopolistic firm are zero; and,
(b) if candidates share the same beliefs about the firm’s costs, the equilibrium is unique and
symmetric.
Proof. I first prove Part (a). For any Nash equilibrium (NE) of the electoral stage
(q∗R, q
∗
L) =
(
(p∗R, t
∗
R), (p
∗
L, t
∗
L)
)
, it must be that,
q∗R ∈ argmax
qR∈Q
{Φ(qR, q∗L) | Π(qR, µR(θ|κ)) ≥ 0} (2.8)
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Furthermore, every voter gets a higher utility, the lower both the price and the tax
rate; and therefore, for every j ∈ V, uj(·) is monotonically decreasing in p and t.
In turn, the profits Π(·) are monotonically increasing in p for any price below pM.
Hence, Π(q) is increasing in both p and t, since the higher t, the higher the subsidy
to the firm which comes from tax collection. Now suppose that in equilibrium q∗R
is such that Π(q∗R, µR(θ|κ)) > 0. Then, there exists a pair ∆1 > 0 and ∆2 > 0
small enough such that q∆R = (p
∗
R − ∆1, t∗R − ∆2), and u(q∆R, j) > u(q∗R, j) for all
j ∈ V. As Gj is increasing in u(qR, j), and Φ is increasing in Gj, it must be that
Φ(q∆R, q
∗
L) > Φ(q
∗
R, q
∗
L). Therefore, q
∗
R cannot be a solution for the program 2.8; and
as a consequence, (q∗R, q
∗
L) cannot be a NE. Analogous argument can be applied for
the case of q∗L. Then, a policy profile can only be an equilibrium if it yields zero
expected profits under both candidates’ policies.
Part (b).
Suppose (q∗R, q
∗
L) is a NE. Moreover, suppose both L and R have the same prior µ(θ);
and receive the same offer of campaign contributions κ. Then,
q∗R ∈ argmax
qR∈Q
{Φ(qR, q∗L) | Π(qR, µ(θ|κ)) ≥ 0}
q∗L ∈ argmax
qL∈Q
{1−Φ(q∗R, qL) | Π(qL, µ(θ|κ)) ≥ 0}
(2.9)
In order to characterise the NE in 2.9, I first notice that the optimization problem of
candidate L satisfies,
argmax
qL∈Q
1−Φ(q∗R, qL) = argmin
qL∈Q
Φ(q∗R, qL) (2.10)
Second, as shown in Part (a) of the current proposition, the profits Π(qL) and Π(qR)
are both binding. Then, there exist Lagrangians λ and χ such that,
∫
j
gj(u(qR, j)− u(qL, j))∇u(qR, j)dF(j) = λ∇Π(qR, µ(θ|κ))∫
j
gj(u(qR, j)− u(qL, j))∇u(qL, j)dF(j) = χ∇Π(qL, µ(θ|κ))
(2.11)
where ∇u and ∇Π represent the gradients, defined as ∇u(·) =
(
∂u
∂p ,
∂u
∂t
)
and
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∇Π(·) =
(
∂Π
∂p ,
∂Π
∂t
)
. I then use the first order optimization conditions 2.11 to prove
the symmetry and uniqueness of the equilibrium as follows.
Symmetry
When the first order conditions in 2.11 are opened by the policy components p and
t, they convey that the marginal gain in expected votes, divided by their effect on
the profits, is the same for both the change in the price and the change in the tax rate.
Formally, there exists a pair (ρp, ρt) such that,
ρp =
∫
j g
j(u(qR, j)− u(qL, j))upR(qR, j)dF(j)∫
j g
j(u(qR, j)− u(qL, j))upL(qL, j)dF(j)
× ΠpL(qL, ·)
ΠpR(qR, ·)
ρt =
∫
j g
j(u(qR, j)− u(qL, j))utR(qR, j)dF(j)∫
j g
j(u(qR, j)− u(qL, j))utL(qL, j)dF(j)
× ΠtL(qL, ·)
ΠtR(qR, ·)
(2.12)
In equilibrium, it must be that ρp = ρt = λχ ; otherwise, a candidate can increase the
vote share by reducing the most elastic component of the policy and increasing the
less sensitive one. Consider now the case qR 6= qL; in particular, and w.l.o.g., pR > pL.
Then, as the expected profits are zero in equilibrium and candidates have the same
beliefs of the cost parameter, it must be that tR < tL. As usual, the first partial
derivatives of the expected profits w.r.t the policy components are non-increasing;
and this implies that ρp < 1 < ρt, contradicting the optimization requirement for
which the ratio λ/χ must be equal for both p and t. Then, (pR, tR) = (pL, tL) is a
necessary condition for the equilibrium.
Uniqueness
Consider the first order condition of the optimization problem when qR = qL,
∫
j
gj(0)∇u(q, j)dF(j) = λ∇Π(q, ·). (2.13)
Now suppose that there exist two pairs (λ′, q′) and (λ′′, q′′) that satisfy 2.13. If
λ′ < λ′′ (λ′ > λ′′), then q′ > q′′ (q′ < q′′) by (strict) concavity of the utility functions
u(·). I define that q′ > q′′ if p′ > p′′ and t′ ≥ t′′; or p′ ≥ p′′ and t′ > t′′. However, if
this is the case, then it cannot be possible that both q′ and q′′ yields zero profits; and
by Part (a), (q′, q′′) cannot be an equilibrium. Hence, in equilibrium, it must be that
λ′ = λ′′ and q′ = q′′; and therefore, the equilibrium is unique.
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Lemma 27A4 (Existence of equilibria at the electoral stage under discontinuous
payoffs). Suppose Φ and 1−Φ are monotonically decreasing in qR and qL respectively.
Furthermore, suppose that the candidates payoffs γRΠ(qR, ·) and γLΠ(qL, ·) are monotoni-
cally increasing in qR and qL. Then, the electoral stage game has at least one (pure) Nash
equilibrium. Moreover, if both candidates R and L are equally popular; i.e., Φ(q∗, q∗) = 1/2
for any q∗ ∈ Q; then any (pure) Nash equilibrium results in zero payoffs for both candidates.
Proof. The proof consists in checking that the sufficient conditions for the existence
of (pure) NE in strategic games with discontinuous payoffs provided by Reny, 1999
are satisfied in the current electoral stage game. These conditions are the following;
compactness of the policy space, quasi-concavity of the payoffs; and that the game is
reciprocally upper semi-continuous and payoff secure. As the lemma states that the
vote share (and the profits) is monotonically decreasing (increasing) in q, I first define
monotonicity w.r.t. the policy as follows. A function f is said to be monotonically
increasing (decreasing) in q if for any pair of policies q0 = (p0, t0) and q1 = (p1, t1)
in Q2; f satisfies,
if p0 < p1 and t0 ≤ t1; then, f (q0) < (>) f (q1); and,
if p0 ≤ p1 and t0 < t1; then, f (q0) < (>) f (q1).
(2.14)
To prove the conditions for the existence of a (pure) NE at the electoral stage, note
that the policy space Q is a compact, convex set in R2. The logic is as follows. q ∈ Q
is comprised of a price p ∈ R+ and a linear-tax rate t ∈ [0, 1]. It is straightforward
checking that the tax component of the policy satisfies compactness. As for the price
component, p is an element of the setR+, which satisfies the least-upper-bound prop-
erty; and therefore, to satisfy compactness it is only pending to set an upper bound
for the feasible p. I then assume that this upper-bound is given by the monopoly
price pM.
Quasi-concavity
It is straightforward showing that for any pair of policies such that Φ < 1/2 or
Φ > 1/2, the payoffs are quasi-concave. Now consider the case where q0 is such
that Φ(q0, ·) < 1/2 and q1 such that Φ(q1, ·) > 1/2. Then, any linear combination
of q0 and q1 will result in a expected payoff in the set co{γΠ(q1, ·), 0}. Therefore,
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candidates’ payoffs are quasi-concave.
Reciprocal upper semi-continuity (u.s.c.)
The reciprocal u.s.c. condition requires that if one player’s payoff discontinuously
jumps up, then the other player’s payoff simultaneously jumps down. In the elec-
toral stage, the discontinuity only takes place at Φ(qR, qL) = 1/2. Therefore, at the
discontinuity, the expected payoff functions of the candidates satisfy,
sgn(γRΠ(qR, ·)− 1/2γRΠ(qR, ·)) = sgn(1/2γLΠ(qL, ·)− 0)
Therefore, the game is reciprocal u.s.c. Note that when γR = γL, the game is trivially
reciprocal u.s.c. since the sum of the candidates’ payoffs is continuous.
Payoff secure
The electoral game is payoff secure if for every candidate C, for all qC ∈ Q, and
for any e > 0 small enough, there exists a q˜C ∈ Q and a neighbourhood of q−C,
named V(q−C), such that for all q−C ∈ V(q−C), uC(q˜C, q−C) ≥ uC(qC, q−C) − e.
This condition requires that given a strategy profile q = (qC, q−C), every player can
find a strategy that yields almost the same payoff than that at q, even when the other
player slightly deviate from q. In the electoral stage, the expected payoffs are in
the co{γΠ(qC, ·), 0} and Π is continuous in qC. Therefore, players can secure their
payoff responding to a slight move of their opponents by slightly lowering their own
price and\or tax rate.
NE with equally popular candidates
I have proved that there exists at least one (pure) NE of the electoral stage game.
Now I show that when both R and L have the same updated beliefs about the firm
costs, and the same popularity; the electoral competition drains the expected profits
to zero. Let R∗(qL) be the (non-empty) set of best replies for R when L plays qL, and
let L∗(qR) (non-empty) be the corresponding set of best replies for L. A NE is then a
profile (q∗R, q
∗
L) such that q
∗
R ∈ R∗(q∗L) and q∗L ∈ L∗(q∗R). Now, assume that γR and
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γL are strictly positive; and define the following sets,
A(qL) = {qR ∈ Q : Π(qR, ·) > 0 & Φ(qR, qL) = 12}
B(qL) = {qR ∈ Q : Π(qR, ·) > 0 & Φ(qR, qL) < 12}
C(qL) = {qR ∈ Q : Π(qR, ·) > 0 & Φ(qR, qL) > 12}
(2.15)
When the candidates are equally popular; i.e., Φ(q, q) = 1/2 for any q ∈ Q; it must
be that,
i. A(qL) * R∗(qL) since by continuity of Π(·), for every qR ∈ A(qL), there exists
a q˜R < qR such that 1/2γRΠ(qR, ·) < γRΠ(q˜R, ·).
ii. C(qL) * R∗(qL) since by continuity of both Π(·) and Φ(·), for every
qR ∈ C(qL), there exists a q˜R > qR such that γRΠ(qR, ·) < γRΠ(q˜R, ·) and still
Φ(·) > 1/2.
iii. B(qL) * R∗(qL) when Π(qL, ·) > 0 (which must happen in equilibrium; other-
wise, L would deviate), since R can always do better by deviating to q˜R = qL
increasing her expected payoff from zero to 1/2γRΠ(qL, ·). However, this im-
plies that q˜R ∈ A(qL); and by item i., q˜R cannot be in R∗(qL).
Then, q∗R ∈ R∗(qL) implies Π(q∗R, ·) = 0. By an analogous argument, q∗L ∈ L∗(qR)
implies Π(q∗L, ·) = 0. Therefore, when candidates are equally popular and share
the same beliefs on the firm cost; any NE results in zero expected payoffs for the
candidates.
Proposition 27A5 (Candidates’ popularity and private interests in regulation). Sup-
pose that one candidate is more popular that the other; i.e., Φ(q, q) 6= 1/2 for every q in Q;
and the shares of the profits γR and γL are strictly positive. Then, in any equilibrium of the
electoral stage,
(a) the most popular candidate obtains a vote share strictly higher than one-half;
(b) the expected profits are strictly positive; and,
(c) the most popular candidate sets a policy q∗ such that at Φ(q∗, ·) = 1/2, the expected
profits under the policy of her opponent are zero.
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Proof. Let R∗(qL) (L∗(qR)) be the (non-empty) set of best replies of candidate R (L)
when L (R) plays qL (qR). Then, a (pure) Nash equilibrium (NE) is a profile of policies
(q∗R, q
∗
L) such that q
∗
R ∈ R∗(q∗L) and q∗L ∈ L∗(q∗R). Now, w.l.o.g., suppose that R is the
most popular candidate. That is to say that whenever qR = qL = q; Φ(q, q) > 1/2.
In addition, assume that γR and γL are strictly positive; and for any given qL ∈ Q,
define the set of all policies that gives R a strict majority,
P(qL) = {qR ∈ Q | Φ(qR, qL) > 12} (2.16)
In lemma 2.7.A.1, I assume that Φ(qR, qL) is continuous and concave in qR; and
therefore, qL is an element of P(qL) (an open subset of R2), since Φ(qL, qL) > 12 by
hypothesis. I now use the fact that for every qL such that Π(qL, ·) ≥ 0 it must be that
R∗(qL) ⊂ P(qL). Otherwise, suppose that q∗R /∈ P(qL); then,
i. if Φ(·) = 12 ; by continuity of Π(·), there exists a q˜R < q∗R such that
1
2Π(q
∗
R, ·) < Π(q˜R, ·); and therefore, q∗R cannot be a best response of candidate
R to qL;
ii. if Φ(·) < 12 ; by continuity of Φ(·) and the fact that Φ(q, q) > 12 , there exists a
neighbourhood V(qL) of qL, such that for all q˜R ∈ V(qL)with q˜R strictly higher
than qL, Φ(qR, qL) > 12 . And as Π(qL, ·) ≥ 0; it must be that Π(qR, ·) > 0 since
qR > qL. Therefore, q∗R cannot be a best response of candidate R to qL.
In this way, I have proved that when candidate R is more popular than candidate L;
any best reply of R yields strictly positive profits and a vote share strictly higher than
one-half. Formally, any q∗R ∈ R∗(qL) satisfies Φ(q∗R, qL) > 12 , and Π(q∗R, ·) > 0. Now
consider the behaviour of the less popular candidate L. In equilibrium, q∗R must be
such that at Φ(q∗R, qL) =
1
2 , Π(qL, ·) = 0. Otherwise,
iii. if at Φ(q∗R, qL) =
1
2 , Π(qL, ·) > 0; then, there exist a q˜L < qL such that L gets
more than one-half of the vote share and still gets positive profits. And after
this move by L, q∗R cannot be a best reply for candidate R anymore;
iv. if at Φ(q∗R, qL) =
1
2 , Π(qL, ·) < 0; then, R is getting more that one-half of the
vote; and therefore, there is still room for R to profitably deviate by setting a
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policy q˜R > q∗R, until Π(qL, ·) = 0 at Φ(q˜R, qL) = 12 . Note that R cannot go
further since then, L will respond setting a policy that makes her win more than
one-half of the vote.
I have proved that if a policy profile (q∗R, q
∗
L) is a (pure) Nash equilibrium; then,
Φ(q∗R, q
∗
L) >
1
2 , Π(q
∗
R, ·) > 0, and Π(qL, ·) = 0 at Φ(q∗R, qL) = 12 . By analogy, when
L is more popular than R; i.e., Φ(q, q) < 12 ; the equilibrium results in Φ(q
∗
R, q
∗
L) <
1
2 ,
Π(q∗L, ·) > 0, and and Π(qR, ·) = 0 at Φ(qR, q∗L) = 12 .
2.7.B Communication before elections
Proposition 27B1 (Campaign contributions as informative signals about costs). Sup-
pose the monopolistic firm gets access to the most popular candidate via campaign contribu-
tions. Then,
(a) There are no equilibria where the firm fully reveals its true costs.
(b) No equilibria where all the cost-types offer the same amount survive the Intuitive
Criterion refinement.
(c) There exist one class of partially informative equilibria where all the cost-types in
each element of a partition of the set [θ−, θ+] offer the same amount of campaign
contributions.
Proof. Part (a). W.l.o.g., suppose R is the most popular candidate. Let’s assess whether
the following profile of strategies and system of beliefs form a WPBE or not;
i. each θi ∈ Θ ≡ [θ−, θ+] offers a different non-negative amount of campaign
contribution κi;
ii. candidate R updates her beliefs such that µ(θi | κi) = 1 for every κi;
iii. candidate R sets a policy qi such that Π(qi | θi)− κi = 0.
Choose a θk ∈ [θ−, θ+). Then, there exist at least one κj 6= κk such that θ j > θk; and,
Π(qj | θk)− κj > Π(qk | θk)− κk = Π(qj | θ j)− κj = 0 (2.17)
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As κj is a profitable deviation for θk and it always exists; there are no equilibria where
the firm fully reveals its true costs.
Part (b).
Consider a WPBE where,
i. Every θ ∈ Θ ≡ [θ−, θ+] offers the same lump sum transfer κ;
ii. candidate R’s beliefs are given by her prior distribution of the firm costs Eµ(θ);
iii. candidate R sets a policy q such that Π(q | µ(θ))− κ = 0.
Off the equilibrium path, any system of beliefs δ for which no cost-type have an
incentive to deviate must satisfy,
Eδ(θ | κ˜) ≤ Eµ(θ) (2.18)
for any κ˜ 6= κ. These equilibria fail to satisfy the Intuitive Criterion (see Cho and Kreps,
1987). To see why, consider any deviation κ˜ > κ such that Π(qmax;Eµ(θ))− κ˜ = 0;
where qmax is the policy that gives R a vote share of one-half.
That is Φ(qmax, q∗L) = 1/2, where q
∗
L is the policy that gives candidate L zero profits;
Π(q∗L | Eµ(θ)) = 0.
After seeing κ˜, candidate R should at least understand that this offer can only come
from a cost-type θ˜ that satisfies,
Π(q | Eµ(θ); θ˜)− κ < 0 ⇐⇒ θ˜ > Eµ(θ) (2.19)
This is true because the cost-type θ = Eµ(θ) is indifferent between the pair (q, κ) and
(qmax, κ˜). And any θ < Eµ(θ) prefers (q, κ) to (qmax, κ˜) since the profits are concave
in q and linear in κ. Therefore, after receiving the offer κ˜, candidate R updates her
beliefs as follows,
Eµ[Eµ(θ), θ+] > Eµ(θ) (2.20)
And by continuity of the set of cost-types, there exists a θ̂ greater than Eµ(θ) for
whom,
Π(q | Eµ[Eµ(θ), θ+]; θ̂)− κ˜ > Π(q | Eµ(θ); θ̂)− κ (2.21)
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Then, for θ̂ the minimum payoff of deviating is higher than the payoff in equilibrium.
And as a consequence, the pooling equilibria do not survive the Intuitive Criterion
refinement.
Part (c).
Let’s assess whether the following profile of strategies and system of beliefs form a
WPBE or not;
i. There exists a partitionN of cardinality N of the set [θ−, θ+] with boundaries
θ0 < ... < θi < θi+1 < ... < θN ; with θ0 = θ− and θN = θ+;
ii. all cost-types in the same element Θi = (θi−1, θi) ofN offer the same lump sum
transfer κi; with κi < κi+1 for all i = 1, ..., N − 1.
iii. after receiving an offer κi; candidate R’s updates her beliefs about the costs via
the Bayes rule as Eµ(θ | Θi);
iv. for each κi, candidate R sets a policy qi such that Π(qi | Eµ(θ | Θi)) = 0.
iv. for each boundary θi;
Π(qi | Eµ(θ | Θi); θi)− κi = Π(qi+1 | Eµ(θ | Θi+1); θi)− κi+1. (2.22)
The strategy of candidate R is sequentially rational given the strategy of the cost-
types and the fact that her beliefs µ are updated via the Bayes rule. Now consider the
strategy of a cost-type θ̂i ∈ int(Θi) ofN;
v. if θ̂i deviates by offering κi+1; as profits are increasing in q;
Π(qi+1 | Eµ(θ | Θi+1); θ̂i) > Π(qi | Eµ(θ | Θi); θ̂i).
Therefore, Incentive Compatibility (IC1) requires,
κi+1 > κi +Π(qi+1 | Eµ(θ | Θi+1); θ̂i)−Π(qi | Eµ(θ | Θi); θi); (2.23)
vi. if θ̂i deviates by offering κi−1; as profits are increasing in q;
Π(qi−1 | Eµ(θ | Θi−1); θ̂i) < Π(qi | Eµ(θ | Θi); θ̂i).
62 Chapter 2. Campaign Contributions and Private Interests
Therefore, Incentive Compatibility (IC2) requires,
κi−1 > κi +Π(qi−1 | Eµ(θ | Θi−1); θ̂i)−Π(qi | Eµ(θ | Θi)θi). (2.24)
By concavity of Π in q, no type i can benefit from offering a κi+j with j > 1. Further-
more, κi − κi−1 is non-increasing in i. Therefore, conditions i. to vi. characterise a
partition WPBE.
Proposition 27B5 (Aligment of incentives between the firm and the most popular
candidate). Suppose R is the most popular candidate and the highest policy that gives her
plurality (max qR | Φ(qR, qL) > 1/2) is below q ≡ (p, t) = (pM(θ), 1). Then, for any
share of the profits γ ∈ (0, 1),
(a) The regulatory policy is given by,
q∗R ∈ argmax
qR∈Q
{Π(qR) | Φ(qR, qL) > 1/2} (2.25)
(b) If the profits are ex-post verifiable, the monopolist reveals its true cost-type θ and gains
(1− γ)Π(q∗R; θ); while candidate R gains γΠ(q∗R; θ).
(c) If the profits are not ex-post verifiable, the monopolistic firm and candidate R bargain
over the share of the profits.
(d) The regulatory policy q∗R is increasing in the popularity of candidate R.
Proof. Part (a). Fix a γ such that the agreed level of profits to share is
Π(q,Eµ(θ | γ)). Then, for a given qL and every q such that Φ(q, qL) > 1/2 the
payoffs of the monopolistic firm E and candidate R are given by;
uR = γΠ(q,Eµ(θ | γ))
uE = Π(q, θ)− γΠ(q,Eµ(θ | γ))
(2.26)
Define qmax as the solution of the following program,
qmax ∈ argmax
q∈Q
{Π(q) | Φ(q, qL) > 1/2} (2.27)
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By monotonicity of the profits w.r.t. the policy; uR is maximised at qmax. Furthermore,
for every pair (θ,γ) and q such thatΠ(q, θ) ≥ γΠ(q,Eµ(θ | γ)); uE is also maximised
at qmax.
Part (b).
If the profits are ex-post verifiable, γ results in the following profile of payoffs;
uR = γΠ(q, θ))
uE = (1− γ)Π(q, θ))
(2.28)
Which are maximised at qmax.
Part (c).
By Part a. and Part b., and regardless of the verifiability of the profits, candidate R
has a incentive to set the policy qmax that maximises the profits subject to Φ > 1/2;
Π(qmax) = Πmax. And therefore, the problem is not one of communication but
instead, a bargaining problem. How much of Πmax candidate R and the firm E
receive, will result from the assignment of probabilities to their respective actions.
Part (d).
For a given qL, Φ(q, qL) is decreasing in q; and Π(q, ·) is increasing in q. Now
consider a pair (Φ0,Φ1) such that for a given qL; Φ0(q, qL) < Φ1(q, qL) for every
q ∈ Q. Then, qmax(Φ0) < qmax(Φ1).
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Chapter 3
Regulation to Redistribute
Well-being: Political Incentives in
Poor Countries
3.1 Introduction
“A developed country is not a place where the poor have cars, but one where the
rich use public transportation.”
Paraphrased from Enrique Peñalosa, Mayor of Bogotá, Colombia
Most countries subsidise tariffs of public utilities such as electricity and transportation;
and governments claim that the main goal of these subsidies is to improve the well-
being of the poor by facilitating their access and use of such services. Furthermore, it
is in poor countries where these highly-subsidised utilities coexist with regressive
provisions of education and health. Therefore, both subsidies to public utilities and
the provision of public goods (income transfers too) are tools that governments use
to redistribute well-being; and in this paper, I study the trade-offs that determine the
choice of the mix of these redistributive policies.
The opening paraphrase from Enrique Peñalosa conveys that in rich (developed)
countries the regulation of public utilities is not a tool for redistribution; since utilities
are consumed in the same way by everybody, the poor and the rich. In contrast,
subsidies to public utilities are pervasive in poor countries, as evident by the data
which shows that the use of subsidies to energy and electricity as a percentage of the
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GDP is particularly large in Emerging and Developing Countries (See Table 3.1 and
Coady et al., 2016).
In this paper, I ask when a country redistributes well-being via subsidies to public
utilities instead of income via transfers. How does this choice affect the relation
between welfare benefits and the regulation of public utilities? How does this choice
change with the level of development of the country?
I address these questions within an environment of a representative democracy
where the utility under regulation is essential for the poorer voters. This feature is
captured by quasilinear preferences for when the income is small enough, citizens
consume only the public utility. In this way, poor voters are better characterised by
their consumption bundle than the actual income they receive. As a consequence, the
poor -and the poverty line- are endogenously defined by the citizens’ behaviour and
not exogenously by a rule, as it is the case in countries’ national statistics.
In turn, candidates care not only about the current effect of the redistributive
policy but they are also concerned with the sustainability of the utility provision,
which is represented by a fraction of the profits that the monopolistic firm should
be allowed to keep by the government. Therefore, candidates differ not only on
their views about the economy, but also on their particular preferences over income
distribution, and even their intertemporal preferences over consumption.
I find that the mix of income transfers and subsidies to utilities depends on the
level of the income threshold that divides the rich and the poor (the endogenous
poverty line), and the location of the swing voters within each of these groups.
The relevance of this prediction becomes evident when a polity fully comprised of
non-poor citizens is considered. In such a case, the median income is the only swing
voter; and therefore, it is income inequality that drives the redistributive policy in
equilibrium. As a result, both subsidies to utilities and income transfers increase with
inequality.
Instead, in my model, the existence of a fraction of the population for whom the
public utility is essential, makes the policy affect the rich and the poor in different
ways. This feature changes the decisive characteristics of the distribution of citizens.
As the number of the poor increases, the model predicts less income transfers and
more redistribution through lower tariffs. This outcome conveys that it is “politically
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Region Energy (%) Electricity (Avg.%) Highest-Country Energy (%)
Advanced 2.7 0.08 Czech Republic 8.4
Latin-America and C. 3.3 2.84 Venezuela 20.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.4 2.86 Zimbabwe 23.4
Emerging Europe 7.7 1.55 Bosnia and Herz. 37.0
Emerging-Dev. Asia 16.7 0.44 Mongolia 21.0
Commonwealth-Ind. 17.4 2.62 Ukraine 60.1
Middle East-North Africa 22.6 1.21 Iran 26.0
Table 3.1: Energy and electricity subsidies as a percentage of the GDP - 2015.
Source: IMF, Fiscal Affairs Department: Country-level Subsidy Estimates,
2015.
efficient” for governments in poor countries to have regressive education and health
systems along with low tariffs of public utilities. As it is corroborated by the evidence
for which the correlation between poverty and electricity tariff is strongly and signifi-
cantly negative (See Figure 3.1). Importantly, my paper departs from the literature on
redistribution in democracies since it is not inequality that explains redistribution but
the poverty rate and the consumption behaviour of the poor.
The model allows to conduct comparative statics on both attributes of the can-
didates, their current income and the intertemporal concern with the sustainability
of the utility provision. Candidates have political preferences over a policy space
with three components; the tariff of the public utility, a linear tax rate, and a universal
income transfer.1 The preference over the tax rate is only affected by the income of
the candidates. As a consequence, when taxation is fixed, the values of transfers and
tariffs are orthogonal to the income of the candidates.
As for the tariff component of the regulatory policy, it affects the candidates’ utility
in two opposite directions. On one hand, a higher tariff increases the profits, hence
the sustainability of the service, which in turn makes the candidate better off. On the
other hand, a higher tariff makes the candidates worse off because they also consume
the public utility. Then, the balance of these two effects determines the direction of
the relation between the tariff of the public utility and the candidates’ attributes.
As I do not restrict a priori the location of the candidates, the model is rich enough
to provide conditions for a wide range of results. For instance, I study when a
1This definition of the policy space is a simplification of the complex tax-and-transfer schemes in
reality. Nevertheless, linear taxation provides a suitable description of the effective taxation scheme
for many countries (Roemer et al., 2003). As for the non-targeted transfers, the National Health
System (NHS) in UK or the minimum wage laws, are examples of welfare benefits of universal access.
Additionally, environments with perfectly targeted-transfers either do not offer solutions or these
solutions are difficult to characterise.
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Figure 3.1: Regression of retail electricity tariff on the poverty rate for 48
countries during the period 1979-2016. The labels correspond to the first and
the last observations available for Denmark, Brazil, Peru and UK. Sources:
LISSY, Cross-national Data Center in Luxembourg; Department for Business,
Energy & Industrial Strategy, UK; IEA, International Energy Agency; OSIN-
ERGMIN, Organismo Supervisor de la Inversión en Energía y Minería; QOG,
Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg.
candidate who cares more about the sustainability of the public utility (intertemporal
efficiency) runs in elections. I show that the intertemporal concern of the actual
candidates is negatively correlated to the poverty rate. The reason is that the poor
prefer a mix with a lower tariff and less income transfers than the rich; and as the
profits are increasing in the tariffs, a candidate who highly values the profits (high
intertemporal concern) has a lesser chance of running in elections when the poor are
more numerous.
The relevance of the paper in the context of the related literature is assessed in
Section 3.2. Section 3.3 lays out the model; describes the preferences of poor and
rich voters; and conducts comparative statics on candidates’ attributes. Section 3.4
develops a benchmark case where all citizens have quasilinear preferences (there are
no poor); with the result that inequality is the main factor explaining redistribution.
Section 3.5 explores a general environment where the society is endogenously divided
in two groups of citizens based on their consumption behaviour. It contains the main
results of the paper. Section 3.6 concludes, and opens further research questions.
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Appendices 3.7.A, 3.7.B, and 3.7.C contain all the proofs.
3.2 Related Literature
I build on the citizen-candidates model (Besley and Coate, 1997a and Osborne and
Slivinski, 1996) to explore the endogenous redistributive policy formation with dif-
ferentiated candidate positions. As I ask about the trade-off between the regulation
of public utilities and income transfers, the policy is multidimensional and citizen-
candidates provides an appropriate tool for characterising this environment.
I start by observing that the pricing regulation of public utilities is a tool for
redistributing well-being. This observation is supported by many studies. I select
three of them. Komives et al., 2008 assess the impact of consumer subsidies for water
and electricity supplies in developing countries, in particular, the degree to which
such subsidies benefit the poor. They compare utility subsidies with the impact
that other poverty focused programs have on income distribution. Granado, Coady,
and Gillingham, 2012 provide empirical evidence on the effect of fuel subsidies on
household welfare in developing countries. They show that fuel subsidies benefit the
rich more than the poor. Asensio, Matas, and Raymond, 2003 present evidence from
Spain showing that public transportation subsidies are progressive.
A seminal political economy literature studies regulation as a redistributive policy.
Aranson and Ordeshook, 1981 test together several explanatory models of public-
sector activity, to find out if they can be applied to regulatory decision making. They
first interpret regulation as a redistributive activity, and assess the implications of
this interpretation in an electoral context. Abrams and Lewis, 1987 develop a median-
voter model to analyse issues of economic regulation and public policy outcomes.
They provide comparative statics relating changes in public-policy outcomes to
changes in relative group sizes, total population, information costs, and population
heterogeneity. These papers provide a meaningful starting point to address positive
questions on regulation from a political economy perspective. However, they never
ask how regulation and the other redistributive policies are jointly connected to
welfare analysis. My model instead explores how the regulation policy is chosen
for its impact on well-being. A priori, tariff subsidies have a disadvantage since they
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negatively affect efficiency. However, I show that when the group of poorer citizens
is large, the positive impact of regulation on the well-being of the poor provides a
powerful political incentive for the subsidies to prevail.
The most closely related papers are Austen-Smith, 2003 and Besley and Coate,
1997b. Austen-Smith, 2003 studies pricing regulation versus income transfers. He
explores a simple majority environment where all individuals have separable pref-
erences. The median voter solutions for both the lump-sum transfer and the price-
subsidy are separately derived. For then establishing the conditions under which one
equilibrium (and its associated policy) is preferred to the other. Austen-Smith’s model
is similar to the benchmark case I develop in this paper where there no poor in the
society. As I show, the comparative statics in this setting is on the income distribution
of the community; and inequality is the main factor explaining the redistributive
policy. The consequence is that regulation and income transfers are of the same kind
and no trade-off emerges between them. More importantly, in this paper I emphasize
that it is poverty and not inequality what explains this trade-off.
Besley and Coate, 1997b explore the free-riding problem in the provision of a
public good. They frame a citizen-candidate model in a policy space comprised
of taxation and the public good. Besley and Coate is close to my paper because
in both, potential candidates are distributed over income and their preference for
a second good. To characterise the solutions, Besley and Coate assume there exist
only two levels of income, and a majoritarian group that strictly prefers certain level
of provision of the public good. Similar to Austen-Smith, Besley and Coate assess
the public good and the income redistribution as two separated choices; and as
the distribution of voters is exogenous, there is no clear trade-off between income
redistribution and the provision of the public good. My paper offers an explanation
for the combination of tariff regulation and income transfers, showing how the
solution critically depends on the fact that the consumption of the poor behaves
differently than that of the rich.
Azzimonti, Francisco, and Krusell, 2008 (similarly, Bassetto and Benhabib, 2006)
explore a dynamic model where production subsidies redistribute resources across
the population. The poorer agents gain from a rise in wages when there is a wealth
effect in labor supply as they work harder. The poor can also indirectly win from the
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redistribution because a current output boost raises the consumption today relative
to the future. Under majority voting, the sequence of subsidies preferred by the
median-wealth consumer is the unique outcome. Although my model is static,
candidates’ intertemporal preferences are captured by the values they assign to the
sustainability of the public utility. In this sense, income transfers are advantageous
since redistributing well-being via regulation is inefficient. Still, my model shows that
the poorer the society, the more the redistributive policy is biased towards regulation.
My paper is also related to the literature on inequality-redistribution in political
environments. Meltzer and Richard, 1981 provide a model of linear taxation and
universal transfers under simple majority. The result is that democracy leads to a
positive relation between redistribution and inequality. In line with intuition, when
the rich are a minority, higher taxation and more income transfers should be expected.
However, when redistribution is defined as public goods or income transfers, this
intuition is not confirmed by the empirical evidence. To address this issue, Benabou
and Tirole, 2006 and Alesina and Angeletos, 20052 consider the role of beliefs about
fairness in explaining the level of redistribution. Whether a society believes that
wealth is a result of individual effort or luck helps explain the cross-country variation
in transfers and taxes. Similarly, Alesina, Cozzi, and Mantovan, 2012 study a model
where proportional tax revenues are redistributed lump-sum to all individuals. Then,
different initial beliefs of how fair is certain level of inequality lead to significantly
different policy results.
These papers study the relation between income distribution and the “size” of the
redistributive policy. As a consequence, they focus on both inequality and the believes
towards inequality. Here instead, I study the factors explaining the combination of the
different redistributive policies with the focus on the different consumption behaviour
by the poor and the rich.
3.3 The Model
A communityV, of a unit mass of voters, elects a policymaker from a large but finite
set of potential candidates C to implement a policy. Each citizen, either candidate
2See also Galasso, 2003, Dhami and Nowaihi, 2010, and Dhami and Nowaihi, 2010.
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or voter, consumes two goods, one good x produced by a linear technology with a
unit price; and the other, the regulated good y, subject to a decreasing average costs
technology that makes monopoly the natural industrial structure (good y represents
the public utility).
Once in office, the elected candidate chooses a policy q ∈ Q of three components,
a variable price -the tariff- p ∈ R+, a lump-sum income transfer of r ∈ R units per
capita, and a linear tax rate t ∈ [0, 1]; all subject to a budget constraint for which
transfers plus subsidies to the tariff cannot exceed the total amount of resources
collected from taxes.
Voters are fully identified by their exogenous income ω ∈ Ω ≡ R+. Candidates
in turn are also concerned with the potential sustainability of the utility, which is
represented by a fraction γ ∈ Γ ≡ (0, 1] of the profits that the monopolistic firm
should be allowed to keep by the policymaker. This feature captures the idea that can-
didates differ not only on their views about the economy, but also on their particular
preferences over income distribution, and even their intertemporal preferences over
consumption. Furthermore, all traits are common knowledge. Therefore, voters know
the values of γ and ω that correspond to each candidate; and candidates observe the
income of each voter.
The preferences of a generic type (ω,γ) are represented by the Von Neumann-
Morgenstern (vNM) utility function V(q,ω,γ) : Q × Ω × Γ → R. If a potential
candidate enters the electoral contest, she pays an entry cost δ > 03. All citizens
derive utility from the implementation of the policy, regardless the identity of the
policymaker.
The sequence of events, illustrated in Figure 3.2, is divided in three stages. In
the first, potential candidates decide whether they compete in election at cost δ or
they stay out. The set E ⊆ C defines the self-selected candidates. In the second stage,
the election takes place. All of the voters have one and only one vote that must be
“sincerely” cast for one of the self-declared candidates. The candidate who receives
the most votes is elected policymaker - plurality rule. Arbitrarily, a tie rule selects the
winning candidate with equal probability from among the tying candidates. If only
3This parameter can represent the campaign costs. The purpose of considering δ strictly positive
rather than zero is to assure that the expected number of candidates is finite; and therefore, the
probability of winning for each candidate is non-zero.
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{yes, no}, δ bj(E), j ∈ V q∗ = (p∗, r∗, t∗)
Candidates
entry
Election Winner’s preferred
policy
Figure 3.2: Sequence of events.
one candidate runs, she is automatically elected as policymaker. In the final stage,
the winning candidate implements her most preferred policy (or the default policy
q0 if no one runs for office).
Under sincere voting, all the strategic behaviour in the model occurs in the entry
stage; and therefore, the solution concept is Nash equilibrium.
3.3.1 Defining the poor
One of the main motivations for subsidising the consumption of utilities like water
supply or electricity is to improve the well-being of the poor by facilitating their
access and use.4 It is implicit in this claim that the consumption of utilities by the
poor behaves differently from the rest of the community; and even more, that the
poor themselves can be defined by their consumption behaviour.
In this line, I capture the idea that the consumption of the public utility is essential
for the poor, assuming the consumers’ preferences are represented by quasilinear
utilities in the form ψ(y) + x. As a consequence, those citizens with an income small
enough spend all their budget on the utility. To see this, consider the indirect utility
function,
V(q,ω) = v(p) + (1− t)ω+ r (3.1)
where q = (p, r, t), v(·) = ψ(ψ′−1(p))− ψ′−1(p)p, v′ < 0, and v′′ < 0.
Then, for a given policy q, there exists an income threshold (the poverty line),
ω0(q) =
ψ′−1(p)p− r
1− t , (3.2)
which divides the community in two groups. One comprised of those citizens with
income greater than ω0(q), named “the rich” (R), who have preferences represented
by function 3.1. And the other, the group of citizens with income below ω0(q),
4See Komives et al., 2008.
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named “the poor” (P), who spend all the income on the public utility. Then, group
P’s preferences are represented by the indirect utility function,
V(q,ω) = ψ
(
(1− t)ω+ r
p
)
(3.3)
The assumption that the poor are better characterised by the bundle they consume
than their actual income has two relevant implications. First, the policy affects not
only the well-being of P and R in different ways, but also their size by shifting the
income threshold. Therefore, in the model the policy determines the poverty line that
divides the poor and the rich. Second, the policy concerns now moves from the usual
focus on income inequality to the attention on the fraction of the society that is poor.
3.3.2 Efficiency, sustainability and income distribution
It is often debated that subsidies have adverse consequences on the sustainability of
the public utility provision. The main argument is that charging consumers less than
the cost of the service leads to inefficiencies and financially weak utilities, reducing
the incentives to expand and improve the utility provision.
A simple way to model this feature is by assuming that candidates differ not only
on their particular preferences over income distribution but also on their concern
with the potential sustainability of the utility, which is represented by a fraction γ of
the profits that the monopolistic firm should be allowed to keep by the policymaker.
To see this, consider the policy that is most preferred by the generic candidate c,
qc ∈ argmax
q∈Q
{V(q,ωc,γc) | Π(q) + tω− r ≥ 0} (3.4)
The profits of the monopolistic firm areΠ(q) = p
[
yP(q) + yR(p)
]−K, where yk is the
demand for good y with k = P, R, and K represents the fixed costs.5 ω =
∫ ∞
0 ωdF(ω)
is the average income; and F(ω) is the fraction of the community with income less
than ω.
The political incentives are determined by the effect of the policy on the voters’
well-being, and it is precisely here where not only the income distribution but the
5For tractability and w.l.o.g, I normalize the marginal cost to zero.
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existence of the groups P and R plays a role. Formally, I first suppose candidate
c wins the election.6 Then, candidate c’s policy induces the voters’ utility vector(
ujc
)
j∈V with ujc = V(qc,ω
j)7, given by,
ujc =

v(pc) + (1− tc)ω j + rc i f j ∈ R
ψ
(
(1−tc)ω j+rc
pc
)
i f j ∈ P
(3.5)
Furthermore, the consumptions of the public utility by groups P and R determine
the budget constraint that candidate c must face8,
B(q) = (1− t)
∫ ω0(q)
0
ωdF(ω) + aP(q)r− aR(q)pv′(p)− K + tω− r ≥ 0 (3.6)
with aP(q) = F(ω0(q)) and aR(q) = 1− aP(q). The budget constraint in 3.6 conveys
that the operating profits from providing the public utility to the poor and the rich
((1− t) ∫ ω0(q)0 ωdF(ω)+ aP(q)r− aR(q)pv′(p)−K)) plus the tax collection (tω) must
be higher or equal than the total amount of income redistributed (r). As a result,
candidates’ objective functions depend on the number of citizens in P and R as
follows,
V(q,ωc,γc) = v(p) + (1− t)ωc + r
+ γc
[
(1− t)
∫ ω0(q)
0
ωdF(ω) + aP(q)r− aR(q)pv′(p)− K
] (3.7)
In order to show how the income distribution and the sustainability concern affect
the policy, I first fix the linear tax rate at t. Then, it is straightforward calculating the
change in the lump-sum redistribution r while the regulated price p adjusts to balance
the budget constraint in 3.6. Defining the set of conditions {t = t, Brdr + Bpdp = 0},
6If nobody is elected, then the default option is implemented resulting in
(
uj0
)
j∈V. Moreover, I
assume the default policy is bad enough for every potential candidate such that at least one candidate
has an incentive to run in elections.
7Superscripts denote attributes while subscripts refer to policy choices.
8See appendix 3.7.A for a complete derivation of the budget constraint.
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named ϑt,
dVc
dr
∣∣∣∣∣
ϑt
= Vcr +V
c
p
dp
dr
= Vcr −Vcp
Br
Bp
=
1
Bp
(
Vcr Bp −Vcp Br
)
,
(3.8)
which can be rearranged as,
Bp
dVc
dr
∣∣∣∣∣
ϑt
= Vcr Bp −Vcp Br (3.9)
Candidate c’s optimal level of redistribution takes place when the expression in 3.9
equals zero. Analogous logic can be applied for obtaining the optimal values of the
tariff and the tax rate under conditions ϑr and ϑp, by fixing r and p respectively. The
next three lemmas use this reasoning to summarize the comparative statics relating
policy components and candidates’ attributes.
Lemma 3 (Candidates’ preferences over p and r). Assume the tax rate is fixed (ϑt). Then,
the optimal values of r and p for candidate c are independent of her income ωc. Furthermore, if
γc(pv′′(p) + v′(p)) + pv′′(p) < 0; then, drdγc
∣∣∣∣
ϑt
> 0; drdt
∣∣∣∣
ϑt
< 0; dpdγc
∣∣∣∣
ϑt
> 0; and dpdt
∣∣∣∣
ϑt
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.A, lemma 3.7.A.1.
Lemma 4 (Candidates’ preferences over t and r). Assume the tariff of the public utility
is fixed (ϑp) and ω0 < ω. Then the optimal values of r and t for candidate c are decreasing in
ωc and increasing in γc. Furthermore, drdp
∣∣∣∣
ϑp
> 0 and dtdp
∣∣∣∣
ϑp
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.A, lemma 3.7.A.2.
Lemma 5 (Candidates’ preferences over p and t). Assume the lump-sum income transfer
is fixed (ϑr) and (ωc + γcω)(pv′′(p) + v′(p)) > v′(p)ω0. Then, the optimal value of the
tariff p (tax rate t) is increasing (decreasing) in both γc and ωc; and decreasing (increasing)
in r.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.A, lemma 3.7.A.3.
The main takeaways from this lemmata are as follows. The preferences over
the tax rate are only affected by the income of the candidates. As a consequence,
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when taxation is fixed, the values of income transfers and tariffs are orthogonal to the
income of the candidates. As for the tariff, its value is determined by an intertemporal
decision. Since the tariff is increasing in the value of the sustainability of the public
utility (future benefit) whenever the tariff’s effect on the profits is high enough to
more than compensate the loss of utility by the candidate as a consumer (present
cost). In turn, the income transfer is increasing in the value of the profits when the
income threshold is below the average.
Another relevant result is that the income transfer and the tax rate are decreasing
in the candidate’s income when the tariff is fixed. This outcome is driven by the
negative net effect that transfers have on the demand of the poor. Moreover, when
the income transfer is fixed, the tariff (tax rate) is increasing (decreasing) in the
candidate’s income. This result is explained by the fact that a higher tariff loosens
the budget constraint; and this allows for lower taxation, which is more preferred by
richer candidates.
3.4 Benchmark: A community with no poor
I begin by characterising the equilibria that take place when there are no poor in the
society; that is to say, when all the citizens have an income high enough that they
consume strictly positive quantities of all goods in the economy. I use the outcomes
of this section as standards of reference to compare with the main results of the paper.
I first analyse a situation where one candidate runs unopposed.9 Then, for an entry
cost sufficiently small, there exists an equilibrium if and only if the only candidate is
a Condorcet winner10. The next lemma shows that the Condorcet winner is identified
with the median income voter.
Lemma 6 (Zero poverty and the median income). When there are no poor in V, a
Condorcet winner exists and coincides with the most preferred policy of the median income
voter.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.B, lemma 3.7.B.1.
9See Besley and Coate, 1997a Corollary 1 pp. 92; and Osborne and Slivinski, 1996 Proposition 2 pp.
71.
10A candidate c is a Condorcet winner if for all k ∈ C \ {c}, c’s vote share is Φc({c, k}) > 12 .
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The next proposition characterises the one-candidate equilibria. As the linearity
of taxation and income transfer result in corner solutions, I include an efficiency cost
for which the reduction in utility caused by a higher taxation is increasing in the tax
rate. This cost is represented by the function d(t) which satisfies the usual regularity
conditions. Furthermore, the proposition requires that the policy implemented when
no candidate runs in elections (default policy) is bad enough to assure that at least
one candidate enters the electoral competition.
Proposition 10 (One-candidate equilibrium and the median income voter). Suppose
δ is small enough, and for every c ∈ C, the “default policy” (the policy implemented when
no candidate runs in elections) is less preferred than the most preferred policy of any other
potential candidate. Then, a one-candidate equilibrium satisfies:
(a) If all the potential candidates in C have the same income; then, the only candidate in E
is the one who values the profits the least.
(b) Suppose a and b in C are the two candidates who rank highest in the order of preferences
of the median income voter ωm; with γa = γb and ωa < ωb. Then, ra > rb.
Furthermore, b (a) is the only candidate if and only if,
ωm > (<) ta−tbd(ta)−d(tb)ω; with ti = d
′−1( ω
ωi
), and i = a, b.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.B, proposition 3.7.B.2.
One takeaway from proposition 10 is that the only candidate must necessarily be
the one who is closest in income to the median voter. The intuition for this result is as
follows. Consider a group of potential candidates with the same value of the profits;
then, by separability, their optimal tariff must be the same. As the lump-sum transfer
is weakly decreasing in income, a high income candidate can only be supported when
the median income is high enough.
In reality, elections are usually contested. Next, I provide a simple tool to analyse
the two-candidate equilibria.
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Voters(V)
(a) Voters and candidates
ω
γ
I({i, k})
i
k
ωm
(b) ωm’s indifference line
ω
γ
I− I+
ICi ICk
ωm
(c) Two-candidate location
Figure 3.3: Quasilinear preferences and two-candidate equilibria. The space
of potential candidates is depicted in gray while the space of voters is the
black and thick horizontal line. The blue line depicts all the citizens (voters
and potential candidates) that are indifferent between candidates i and k.
Two candidate equilibria
Here, I show that when there are no poor in the community, there is no trade-off
between tariff and income transfer; and therefore, both redistributive policies are
positively correlated with inequality. Throughout the analysis, I draw on the litera-
ture on citizen-candidates, by characterising the conditions that any two-candidate
equilibrium must satisfy.11
The space of citizens (voters and potential candidates) is comprised of a unit mass
of voters defined by the setV = {(ω,γ) ∈ Ω× Γ | γ = 0}, and a “feasible” space of
potential candidates given by CA = {(ω,γ) ∈ Ω× Γ | γ ∈ (0, 1]}. Then, V ∪CA is
convex for it forms a rectangle as the one showed in Figure 3.3a. Furthermore, as the
preferences are linear on the citizens’ attributes, for any pair of candidates (policies),
there exist a line (indifference line) that defines two convex subspaces comprised of
citizens who prefer one policy or the other. The intersection of the indifference line
with the space of voters defines the vote share of each of the candidates. The next
lemma and corollary formalize this result.
Lemma 7 (Candidates’ vote share: Separating indifference line). For any two feasible
candidates i and k, there exist a unique pair (rik, cik), where rik is a vector in R2 and cik a
11First, the probability of winning of the candidates must be one-half (see Appendix 3.7.B, definition
3.7.B.5 for a formal definition of probability of winning). Second, their positions must be distant enough
for both getting a positive payoff from competing in elections. At the same time, candidates must be
close enough to deter a third candidate from entering the electoral competition, either for winning
herself or for changing the identity of the winner.
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scalar, which satisfies,
u(qi,ω,γ) T u(qk,ω,γ) if and only if (rik1 , rik2 ) · (ω,γ) T cik
Furthermore, (rik, cik) is fully defined by the straight line u(qi,ω,γ)− u(qk,ω,γ) = 0,
named indifference line I{i, k}; and the intersection of I{i, k} with the space of voters defines
the vote shares of candidates i and k.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.B, lemma 3.7.B.3.
Corollary 2 (Slope of the indifference line). Fix a pair of candidates (i, k) such that
γi < γk. Furthermore, suppose I({i, k}) intersects the space of voters at ω∗ ∈ int(V). Then,
the slope of I({i, k}) is positive (negative) if and only if
v(pi)− v(pk) > (<) piv′(pi)− pkv′(pk)−ω(ti − tk).
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.B, corollary 3.7.B.4.
Corollary 2 shows that the indifference line is upward (downward) sloping when
the loss of utility of the consumers from a higher tariff is greater (smaller) than the
benefit of a higher tariff for relaxing the budget constraint. The logic for this result
is as follows. When the value of the sustainability of the public utility γ increases,
the optimal tariff increases as well. Then, if the loss of well-being that results from
consuming a lesser amount of the utility is greater (smaller) than the benefit from
the relaxation of the constraint, a lower (higher) tax rate is needed for the voters still
being indifferent between the two candidates. Therefore, as a lower tax rate is set by
the candidate with the higher income, the indifference line has a positive (negative)
slope.
An equilibrium with two candidates requires that both candidates get one-half of
the total vote. Moreover, by lemma 7, the intersection of the indifference line with
the space of voters defines the vote share of each candidate. As a consequence, in
equilibrium, the indifference line must intersect the space of voters at the median
income (see Figure 3.3b).
The next lemma proves the decisive role of the median income on the choice
of the redistributive policy when there are no poor in the society; and provides an
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expression for the minimum distance between the candidates that assures positive
payoffs from competing in elections (see Figure 3.3c).
Lemma 8 (Two-candidate equilibria: Incentive compatibility). Any equilibrium with
two candidates (i and k) satisfies,
(a) The indifference line intersects the space of voters at the median income,
(ωm, 0) ∈ I({i, k}); and therefore, the probabilities of winning of the candidates are
both one-half, Pi
({i, k}) = Pk({i, k}) = 12 .
(b) There exist two lines, I−({i, k}) and I+({i, k}) parallel to I({i, k}), that define the
minimum horizontal distance between the candidates’ locations. This distance is given
by |4δ||d(ti)−d(tk)| .
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.B, lemma 3.7.B.6.
The next proposition shows that when there are no poor in the society, there
is no trade-off between tariff to public utilities and income transfers as tools for
redistribution. In particular, the proposition proves that both redistributive policies
are increasing in the income inequality of the society.
Proposition 11 (Tariff, income transfer and income inequality). In any two-candidate
equilibrium, the income transfer r increases with the income inequality iff ω > ωmd′(tk); and
the tariff of the public utility p decreases with the income inequality iff ω > L
(
pk,ω
)
ωmd′(tk);
with L
(
pk,ω
)
= pkv′′(pk)(− ∂tk∂pk )−1. Furthermore, the higher the income inequality the
poorer the candidates competing in elections.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.B, proposition 3.7.B.7.
The conclusions of the section are as follows. When there are no poor in the
community, all of the citizens have similar consumption behaviour; and therefore,
the median income is the decisive voter. Furthermore, when the median income is
sufficiently smaller than the average income, a more unequal society increases the
amount of redistribution via both subsidies to public utilities and income transfers.
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3.5 The effect of poverty on redistribution
In this section, I present the main results of the paper. I come back to the general
version of the model by including the poor citizens for whom the public utility is
essential. As analysed in subsection 3.3.1, in such environment, the threshold that
divides the poor and the rich (the poverty line) is endogenous; and therefore, a change
in the policy affects the welfare of each of these groups in different ways.
I show that, in an environment with two candidates, the society is potentially
divided in four groups of citizens (instead of the two groups taking place under
the median voter solution): the very poor, the poor middle class, the rich middle
class, and the very rich. Furthermore, this new community grouping determines the
combination of the two redistributive policies, the tariff of the public utility and the
income transfer. More importantly, the relative sizes of these groups decisively affect
the relation between poverty, redistribution and the sustainability of the public utility
provision.
Formally, I consider an equilibrium with candidates i and k. For the candidates to
have an incentive to enter, it must be that both have one-half probability of winning;
Pi({i, k}) = Pk({i, k}) = 1/2. An additional incentive compatibility condition that
must hold is that both candidates are distant enough from each other to get positive
expected payoffs from competing in elections; i.e., 1/2
(
uii − uki
) ≥ δ and 1/2(ukk −
uik
) ≥ δ.
Under these incentive compatibility conditions, the two candidates and the com-
munity of voters comprised of two groups with different consumption behaviour
(the poor and the rich) induce a priori four critical points. One swing voter per group,
ω∗P(i, k) and ω∗R(i, k), who are indifferent between the policies of candidates i and k.
Moreover, one income threshold per candidate, ω0(i) and ω0(k), since the income
threshold is endogenous to the policy. In this way, ω0(i) represents the poverty line
under the policy of candidate i, while ω0(k) is the poverty line that corresponds with
candidate k.
Then, I define the very poor (VP) (the very rich (VR)) as the group of citizens with
income smaller (greater) than the poor swing voter’s ω∗P(i, k) (the rich swing voter’s
ω∗R(i, k)). Furthermore, the poor middle class (PMC) (the rich middle class (RMC))
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ω∗0(i, k)
Poor
Rich
i ≺ k
k ≺ i
Figure 3.4: Coalition pair 1. The poor P vote for candidate k and the rich R
vote for candidate i. There exists only one income threshold, ω0(i, k), for both
candidates.
consists of all the citizens with income greater (smaller) than ω∗P(i, k) (ω∗R(i, k)) and
smaller (greater) than the poverty line ω0(·).
The next lemma defines the feasible combinations of coalitions that take place
under the new community grouping.
Lemma 9 (The poor and the rich: Coalitions under two swing voters). In any two-
candidate equilibrium, there exist at most two swing voters who define three possible coalition
pairs,
(a) Coalition pair 1: all citizens in the poor group (P) vote for one candidate; and all
citizens in the rich group (R) vote for the other candidate.
(b) Coalition pair 2: the very poor (VP) vote for the same candidate as the rich middle
class (RMC); and the poor middle class (PMC) vote for the same candidate as the very
rich (VR).
(c) Coalition pair 3: the very poor (VP) vote for the same candidate as the very rich
(VR); and the poor middle class (PMC) vote for the same candidate as the rich middle
class (RMC).
Where the group VP (VR) comprises all voters located to the left (right) of ωP∗(i, k)
(ωR∗(i, k)). In turn, PMC (RMC) refers to the group of voters located to the left (right) of
ω0(·) and the right (left) of ωP∗(i, k) (ωR∗(i, k)).
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.C, lemma 3.7.C.1.
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ω∗P(i, k) ω0(i, k) ω∗R(i, k)
Very poor Rich middle class
Poor middle class Very rich
i ≺ k
k ≺ i
Figure 3.5: Coalition pair 2. The very poor VP and the rich middle class
RMC vote for candidate k. The poor middle class PMC and the very rich VR
vote for candidate i. The longest segment depicts the voters’ space. The two
segments of the coalition VP-RMC are shifted upward. The two segments of
the coalition PMC-VR are shifted downward. By lemma 10, there exists only
one poverty line, ω0(i, k).
The next lemma shows that when either the coalition pair 1 or 2 take place, the
poverty line is the same under the policies of both candidates; ω0(i) = ω0(k) (see
figures 3.4 and 3.5). The logic is as follows. For any two candidates i and k, there exist
at most two swing voters ω∗P(i, k) and ω∗R(i, k). Therefore, in any situation where
the very rich prefer the same candidate as the poor middle class, for the candidates
to get exactly one-half of the vote, the threshold under the two policies must be the
same.12 An analogous reasoning applies to the case in which the only swing voter
coincides with the income threshold. This characteristic is crucial for conducting
comparative statics on poverty since it allows to fix the poverty line for then assessing
how the mix of redistributive policies changes with the size of the poor.
Lemma 10 (Two candidates, one poverty line). In any equilibrium with candidates i and
k, if either coalition pair 1 or coalition pair 2 take place; then, there exist one and only one
income threshold; i.e., ω0(i) = ω0(k). The income threshold common to candidates i and k is
named ω0(i, k).
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.C, lemma 3.7.C.2.
12In Appendix 3.7.C, the proof of lemma 3.7.C.1 provides the conditions for the preferences of the
very poor being aligned with the preferences of the rich middle class. And for the poor middle class to
prefer the same candidate as the very rich.
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I first examine the case of the coalition pair 1. As the poor vote for a different
candidate than the rich, the swing voter is at the poverty line (income threshold);
which means that in equilibrium half of the community is poor, F(ω0) = 1/2.
Now, I suppose that the size of the poor increases (F(ω0) goes up). In this
new situation, the candidate who is preferred by the poor wins with certainty; and
therefore, the original pair of candidates (and policies) cannot be an equilibrium any
more. In order to restore the equilibrium, the candidate preferred by the rich must be
a new candidate that “pleases” some citizens in the previous poor group. Then, the
new swing voter must be a member of the poor group from the previous equilibrium.
The next proposition shows that in order to shift the swing voter from the income
threshold to the subspace of the poor, both the tariff of the public utility and the
income transfer must decrease.
Proposition 12 (Tariff, income transfer and the poor). Under coalition pair 1 both the
tariff and the income transfer decrease with the size of the poor.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.C, proposition 3.7.C.3.
An analogous reasoning can be applied to coalition pair 2. In this case, as there are
two swing voters and the very poor vote for the same candidate as the rich middle
class, the increase in poverty must come from the very poor.
The next proposition shows that as the number of the very poor increases, less
income transfer and more well-being redistribution via lower tariff are required to
re-establish the equilibrium. Furthermore, the proposition shows that the income
transfer is increasing in the very poor when the tariff remain unchanged. Therefore, it
is the presence of tariff regulation as a redistributive policy that explains the negative
relation between poverty and income transfer.
Proposition 13 (Tariff, income transfer and the very poor). Suppose coalition pair 2
takes place. Fix an equilibrium with candidates i and k such that pk < pi. Then,
(a) The tariff and the income transfer are decreasing in the size of the very poor when the
tax rate is fixed.
(b) The income transfer is increasing in the size of the very poor when the tariff is fixed.
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ω∗P(i, k) ω0(·) ω∗R(i, k)
Very poor
Rich middle classPoor middle class
Very rich
i ≺ k
k ≺ i
Figure 3.6: Coalition pair 3. The very poor VP and the very rich VR vote
for candidate k. The poor middle class PMC and the rich middle class RMC
vote for candidate i. The longest segment depicts the voters’ space. The two
segments of the coalition VP-VR are shifted upward. The two segments of
the coalition PMC-RMC are shifted downward. There may exist two income
thresholds (poverty lines), one per candidate. For clarity, only one threshold
is included, labelled ω0(·).
(c) The tariff is either increasing or decreasing in the size of the very poor when the income
transfer is fixed.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.C, proposition 3.7.C.4.
Lastly, I characterize the equilibrium under the coalition pair 3 (see figure 3.6). In
this case, it is not possible to fix the poverty line since the income threshold can differ
among the candidates’ policies. This feature implies that a larger size of the very poor
does not necessarily imply a larger size of the poor.
In the next corollary, I show that under the coalition pair 3, both the tariff to the
public utility and the income transfer are decreasing in the very poor.
Corollary 3 (Tariff and income transfer under coalition pair 3). Suppose coalition pair 3
takes place. Then, the tariff p and the income transfer r are decreasing in the size of the very
poor when the tax rate is fixed.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.C, corollary 3.7.C.5.
The next proposition assesses the relation between the poverty rate in a society
and the sustainability of the public utility provision. In the lexicon of the model, it
shows that a candidate who cares more about the profits of the monopolistic firm (the
provider of the public utility) has lesser chance of competing in elections when the
size of the poor (very poor) is larger.
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Proposition 14 (Poverty and intertemporal efficiency). Suppose conditions in lemma 3
are satisfied, and the tax rate is fixed. Then, under coalition pairs 1 and 2, the sustainability
of the public utility provision decreases with the size of the poor.
Proof. It follows from lemma 3, propositions 12 and 13, and corollary 3.
3.6 Conclusions
Empirical evidence suggests that subsidies to tariffs of public utilities are related
to the level of development of the countries. Particularly in poor countries, highly-
subsidised utilities usually coexist with regressive provisions of public goods. Ar-
gentina provides an example that illustrates this case. During the last fifteen years,
the tariffs of electricity, gas, and transportation have covered a small percentage of
the operating costs; and at the same time, the provision of higher education of uni-
versal access has been regressive; since it is less probable that a poor citizen attends
university while she pays for its public provision through indirect taxation.
To account for these facts, I build on a citizen-candidate model to study the effect
of poverty (and the consumption behaviour of the poor) on the combination of two
different redistributive policies; regulation and income transfers. As the public utility
is essential for the poor, the threshold that divides the poor and the rich is endogenous;
and therefore, a change in the redistributive policy changes the size of the poor and
the rich groups. Importantly, this feature provides a novel approach to study the
political economy of redistribution since it departs from the focus on inequality to
explore the effects of poverty.
The model also incorporates the potential inefficiencies that may arise from subsi-
dising public utilities. This effect is captured by candidates that are concerned with
the potential sustainability of the service, which is represented by a fraction of the
profits that the monopolistic firm should be allowed to keep by the policymaker.
The main result of the paper is that the trade-off between income transfers and
subsidies to public utilities depends on the location of the decisive voters in the rich
and the poor groups. As the size of the poor (very poor) increases, the policy moves
towards less income transfers and more subsidies to public utilities.
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This conclusion helps explain when a poor country provides public goods mostly
afforded by low income citizens along with low tariffs of public utilities such as
electricity or transportation. It also captures the idea that, even when subsidising
public utilities is inefficient, a high poverty rate pushes the redistributive policy
towards lower tariffs of public utilities.
Space for future empirical research opens ahead. This endeavour requires two
steps. First, to test the relation between poverty and subsidies to tariffs of public
utilities, selecting accurate control variables. This task is not trivial since in the model
poverty is endogenous; and therefore, a proper instrumental variable is needed.
Second, in order to test the assumption on the consumption behaviour of the poor,
the collection of data from the household surveys of a sample of countries is required
to assess the relation between the households’ expenditure on the public utility and
their income.
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3.7 Appendices
3.7.A Policy choice
Voting and candidates entry
I present a formal description of the voting and the entry stages of the game. The
winner of the election is the candidate who obtains the most votes. If two or more
candidates tie, each wins with equal probability. In my model, I study the equilibria
with two candidates; and therefore, voting is “sincere.” Since when two candidates
run for policymaker, sincere voting is a dominant strategy.13
Under sincere voting, all the strategic behaviour in the model occurs in the entry
stage. Let αk ∈ {0, 1} be the candidate k’s entry action; where αk = 1 denotes entry
and αk = 0 staying out. A profile of entry decisions is a vector α =
(
αi
)
i∈C. Then, the
set of candidates is defined as E = {i ∈ C : αi = 1}.
The entry stage is a strategic game in which the set of players is the set of potential
candidates C, the set of actions is αk ∈ {0, 1} for all k ∈ C, and the payoffs are defined
by the expression 3.7. The solution concept is Nash equilibrium.
I define the best responses, the winning candidate sets, and the equilibrium. Let
Φi(E) be the vote share of candidate i when the set of candidates is E and
Φ(E) =
(
Φk(E)
)
k∈E is the profile of vote shares. Then, given a profile of entry
strategies, candidate i ∈ E expects to win with probability Pi(E,Φ(E)).
A profile of entry actions α∗ =
(
α∗i
)
i∈C is an equilibrium if for each potential candidate
i ∈ C,
α∗i ∈ argmax
α∈{0,1}
∑
k∈E(α∗−i ,αi)
Pk
(
E(α∗−i, αi),Φ(E(α
∗
−i, αi))
)× uik
+ P0
(
E(α∗−i, αi)
)× ui0 − δ× αi
(3.10)
where P0
(
E
)
denotes the probability that the default policy is selected. P0 = 1 if
E = ∅; and zero otherwise.
13When three or more candidates run in elections, the assumption of a continuum of voters makes no
one pivotal, and therefore, sincere voting is an undominated strategy. However, some authors argue
that even in large polities voters behave strategically (see Roemer, 2006).
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The set of winning candidates is given by,
W(E) =
{
n1, ..., nN ∈ E : Φn1 = ... = ΦnN > Φk
f or all k ∈ E \ {n1, ..., nN}
} (3.11)
The probability of winning of a particular candidate i is Pi
(
E
)
= 1 if W(E) = {k};
Pi
(
E
)
= 1#W(E) if #W(E) > 1 and k ∈W(E); and zero otherwise.
The preferences of the candidates
Here, I formally derive the candidates’ objective functions and characterize their
response to changes in the policy components.
I first define the total income of the poor group P,
W0(q) =
∫ ω0(q)
0
ωdF(ω) =
∫ ω0(q)
0
ω
dF(ω)
dω
dω (3.12)
Then, by the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus (FTC) and the fact that the income ω
is exogenous, the partial derivative of W0 w.r.t. the policy component z is,
W0z =
d
dz
[ ∫ ω0(z)
0
ω
dF(ω)
dω
dω
]
=
dω0(z)
dz
[
ω0(z) f (ω0(z))
]
(3.13)
Replacing the expression of the income threshold ω0(q) = ψ
′−1(p)p−r
1−t and opening by
the policy components,
W0r = (1− t)−2[ψ′−1(p)p− r] f (ω0(q))(−1) < 0
W0t = (1− t)−3[ψ′−1(p)p− r]2 f (ω0(q)) > 0
W0p = (1− t)−2[(ψ′−1)′(p)p + ψ′−1(p)][ψ′−1(p)p− r] f (ω0(q)) > 0
(3.14)
The expression W0r < 0 (W0t > 0) conveys that the total income of the poor group P
is decreasing (increasing) in r (t); and it is satisfied if ψ′−1(p)p > r; which happens
whenever the size of group P is higher than zero. Moreover, for W0p > 0, it is sufficient
to assume that the marginal revenue (and the marginal profits when the marginal
cost is zero) from the provision of the public utility to group R is negative, and
this happens for every tariff below the one under monopoly. Then, as the sign of
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the marginal revenue w.r.t. the quantity is the opposite of the sign of the marginal
revenue w.r.t. the price, (ψ′−1)′(p)p + ψ′−1(p) > 0.
In order to derive the budget constraint, I start with its general form
Π(q) + tω− r ≥ 0. The profit component is,
Π(q) = (p− θ)[yP(q) + yR(p)]− K (3.15)
where yk is the demand for good y with k = P, R, and θ and K are the marginal and
fixed costs respectively. For tractability and w.l.o.g, I assume θ = 0.
The indirect utility function of citizens in group R is v(p) + (1− t)ω + r. Then, by
the Roy’s identity, the demand for y, yR, is −v′(p). In turn, citizens in the poor group
P consume all the income in y. Therefore,
Π(q) = (1− t)
∫ ω0(q)
0
ωdF(ω) + aP(q)r− aR(q)pv′(p)− K (3.16)
with aP(q) = F(ω0(q)) and aR(q) = 1− aP(q). In this way, the budget constraint is
given by,
B(q) = (1− t)
∫ ω0(q)
0
ωdF(ω) + aP(q)r− aR(q)pv′(p)− K + tω− r ≥ 0 (3.17)
Then, the preferences of a generic candidate c are represented by the following
objective function,
V(q,ωc,γc) = v(p) + (1− t)ωc + r
+ γc
[
(1− t)
∫ ω0(q)
0
ωdF(ω) + aP(q)r− aR(q)pv′(p)− K
] (3.18)
For equations 3.17 and 3.18 to be a fair optimization problem it must be that every
component of the policy that boosts the welfare, do not relax the budget constraint.
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Then, the budget constraint changes with the policy components as follows,
Br = −
(
1− F(ω0))− p f (ω0)
1− t
(
v′(p) + ψ′−1(p)
)
Bp = −(1− F(ω0))
(
pv′′(p) + v′(p)
)
+ p
f (ω0)
1− t [(ψ
′−1)′(p)p + ψ′−1(p)]
(
v′(p) + ψ′−1(p)
)
Bt = ω−
∫ ω0(q)
0
ωdF(ω)
+ p
f (ω0)
(1− t)2 [ψ
′−1(p)p− r](v′(p) + ψ′−1(p))
(3.19)
In turn, the change in generic candidate c’s objective function when the policy com-
ponents change is given by,
Vcr = 1+ γ
cF(ω0)− γc p f (ω
0)
1− t
(
v′(p) + ψ′−1(p)
)
Vcp = v
′(p)− γc(1− F(ω0))(pv′′(p) + v′(p))
+ γc p
f (ω0)
1− t [(ψ
′−1)′(p)p + ψ′−1(p)]
(
v′(p) + ψ′−1(p)
)
Vct = −ωc − γc
∫ ω0(q)
0
ωdF(ω)
+ γc p
f (ω0)
(1− t)2 [ψ
′−1(p)p− r](v′(p) + ψ′−1(p))
(3.20)
Vr in 3.20 has four components: the candidate’s gain as a receiver of a greater r; the
partial increase in the profits because those citizens still in group P demands more
due to a greater r; the negative effect on the profits for group P shrinks; and the
positive effect on the profits for the expansion of group R. Analogous logic can be
used to interpret Vp and Vt.
Next, I take advantage of the fact that the functional form of utilities are identical
for every citizen to simplify expressions 3.19 and 3.20. I first consider the consumer
problem of a citizen in group R,
(x∗, y∗) = argmax
(x,y)∈R2+
{ψ(y) + x | py + x ≤ (1− t)ω+ r}
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The solution is given by the pair,
y∗ = ψ′−1(p)
x∗ = (1− t)ω+ r− pψ′−1(p)
The corresponding indirect utility function,
ψ
(
ψ′−1(p)
)− pψ′−1(p) + (1− t)ω+ r
Redefining the indirect utility function as v(p) + (1− t)ω+ r,
v′(p) + ψ′−1(p) =
(
ψ′−1(p)
)′(
ψ′
(
ψ′−1(p)
)− p) = 0
since ψ′
(
ψ′−1(p)
)
= ψ′(y∗) = p. Applying this result to the equations 3.19 and 3.20,
I obtain a set of first partial derivatives of B and Vc w.r.t. the policy components as
follows,
Br = −
(
1− F(ω0))
Bp = −(1− F(ω0))
(
pv′′(p) + v′(p)
)
Bt = ω−
∫ ω0(q)
0
ωdF(ω)
Vcr = 1+ γ
cF(ω0)
Vcp = v
′(p)− γc(1− F(ω0))(pv′′(p) + v′(p))
Vct = −ωc − γc
∫ ω0(q)
0
ωdF(ω).
(3.21)
Lemma 37A1 (Candidates’ preferences over p and r). Assume the tax rate is fixed
(ϑt). Then, the optimal values of r and p for candidate c are independent of her income ω
c.
Furthermore, if γc(pv′′(p) + v′(p)) + pv′′(p) < 0; then, drdγc
∣∣∣∣
ϑt
> 0; drdt
∣∣∣∣
ϑt
< 0; dpdγc
∣∣∣∣
ϑt
> 0;
and dpdt
∣∣∣∣
ϑt
< 0.
Proof. As candidates have quasilinear preferences, the income of the candidate affects
her preferences over the policy only through the tax rate. As the tax rate is fixed at t,
the optimal choice of r and p does not depend on the candidate’s income.
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In order to examine the effect of γc on r and p, I start from the function,
g(r, p,γc|ϑt) = Vcr Bp −Vcp Br = 0.
By equations 3.21,
Vcr = (1+ γ
c) + γcBr
Vcp = v
′(p) + γcBp
Then,
g(r, p,γc|ϑt) = (1+ γc)Bp − v′(p)Br = 0
By the implicit function theorem (IFT),
dr
dγc
∣∣∣∣
ϑt
= −
∂g
∂γc
∂g
∂r
∣∣∣∣
ϑt
= − Bp
(1+ γc)Bpr − v′(p)Brr
(3.22)
In order to test the sign of 3.22, I first obtain,
Brr = − f (ω
0)
1− t
Bpr = − f (ω
0)
1− t
(
pv′′(p) + v′(p)
) (3.23)
Substituting in 3.22,
dr
dγc
∣∣∣∣
ϑt
= − −(1− F
(
ω0
)
)
(
pv′′(p) + v′(p)
)
f (ω0)
1−t
[
γc(pv′′(p) + v′(p)) + pv′′(p)
]
(3.24)
The numerator in 3.24 is positive whenever the “opposite” of the marginal revenue
of providing the utility to group R w.r.t. the price, pv′′(p) + v′(p), is smaller than
zero. In turn, the denominator is negative if, when the tariff increases, the effect on
the value of the increased profits is high enough to more than compensate the loss of
utility of the candidate as a consumer. Formally,
dr
dγc
∣∣∣∣
ϑt
> 0 i f γc(pv′′(p) + v′(p)) + pv′′(p) < 0. (3.25)
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The effect of γc on p is given by,
dp
dγc
∣∣∣∣
ϑt
= −
∂g
∂γc
∂g
∂p
∣∣∣∣
ϑt
= − Bp
(1+ γc)Bpp − v′(p)Brp − v′′(p)Br (3.26)
The sign of the numerator is positive for the same logic applied in 3.24. A sufficient
condition for the denominator to be negative is that pv′′′(p) + v′′(p) > 0. This
condition conveys that the partial reduction in profits that comes from the decrease in
the consumption of the public utility by group R due to an increase in p, is decreasing.
When this condition is satisfied, the effect of γc on p is positive. Formally,
dp
dγc
∣∣∣∣
ϑt
> 0 i f pv′′′(p) + v′′(p) > 0. (3.27)
Lastly, I consider the effect of γc on the fixed tax rate t. The change in g when t
increases is given by,
∂g
∂t
∣∣∣∣
ϑt
=
f (ω0)ω0
(1− t)
[
γc(pv′′(p) + v′(p)) + pv′′(p)
]
(3.28)
Under condition 3.25, ∂g
∂t
∣∣∣∣
ϑt
< 0. As a result, drdt
∣∣∣∣
ϑt
< 0 and dpdt
∣∣∣∣
ϑt
< 0.
Lemma 37A2 (Candidates’ preferences over t and r). Assume the tariff of the public
utility is fixed (ϑp) and ω0 < ω. Then the optimal values of r and t for candidate c are
decreasing in ωc and increasing in γc. Furthermore, drdp
∣∣∣∣
ϑp
> 0 and dtdp
∣∣∣∣
ϑp
> 0.
Proof. I consider the function g(r, t,γc,ωc|ϑp) = Vcr Bt −Vct Br = 0. By equations 3.21,
Vcr = (1+ γ
c) + γcBr
Vct = −(ωc + γcω) + γcBt
Then,
g(r, t,γc,ωc|ϑp) = (1+ γc)Bt + (ωc + γcω)Br = 0
By the IFT,
dr
dγc
∣∣∣∣
ϑp
=
∂g
∂γc
∂g
∂r
∣∣∣∣
ϑp
= − Bt +ωBr
(1+ γc)Btr + (ωc + γcω)Brr
(3.29)
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In order to test the sign of 3.29, I first obtain,
Brr = − f (ω
0)
1− t
Btr =
f (ω0)
(1− t)ω
0
(3.30)
Substituting in 3.29,
dr
dγc
∣∣∣∣
ϑp
= − ωF(ω
0)− ∫ ω0(q)0 ωdF(ω)
f (ω0)
1−t
[
(1+ γc)ω0 − (ωc + γcω)
] (3.31)
The denominator in 3.31 is negative if the income threshold is below the average in-
come. As for the numerator, the total income of the poor group is always smaller than
the average income weighted by the proportion of the poor in the total population.
The difference between the two can be interpreted as a measure of inequality; and it
is always positive. Therefore,
dr
dγc
∣∣∣∣
ϑp
> 0 i f ω0 < ω (3.32)
For a binding budget constraint, the sign of the effect of γc on the optimal t must
be the same as the sign of the effect of γc on r. As a result, under condition 3.32,
dt
dγc
∣∣∣∣
ϑp
> 0.
Now I consider the effect of the candidate’s income on r,
dr
dωc
∣∣∣∣
ϑp
=
∂g
∂ωc
∂g
∂r
∣∣∣∣
ϑp
= − Br
(1+ γc)Btr + (ωc + γcω)Brr
(3.33)
Therefore,
dr
dωc
∣∣∣∣
ϑp
= − −(1− F(ω
0))
f (ω0)
1−t
[
(1+ γc)ω0 − (ωc + γcω)
]
(3.34)
The numerator is negative and so is the denominator if ω0 < ω. Then, the optimal r
is decreasing in ωc, drdωc
∣∣∣∣
ϑp
< 0. It is straightforward showing that dtdωc
∣∣∣∣
ϑp
< 0.
Lastly, I consider the effect of the fixed tariff on r,
dr
dp
∣∣∣∣
ϑp
= −
∂g
∂p
∂g
∂r
∣∣∣∣
ϑp
=
(1+ γc)Btp + (ωc + γcω)Brp
(1+ γc)Btr + (ωc + γcω)Brr
(3.35)
3.7. Appendices 97
Therefore,
dr
dp
∣∣∣∣
ϑp
= −
− f (ω0)1−t ∂ω
0
∂p
[
(1+ γc)ω0 − (ωc + γcω)
]
f (ω0)
1−t
[
(1+ γc)ω0 − (ωc + γcω)
] (3.36)
The numerator is positive when ω0 < ω because ∂ω
0
∂p > 0. Then, the optimal r (t) is
increasing in p.
Lemma 37A3 (Candidates’ preferences over p and t). Assume the lump-sum income
transfer is fixed (ϑr) and (ωc + γcω)(pv′′(p) + v′(p)) > v′(p)ω0. Then, the optimal
value of the tariff p (tax rate t) is increasing (decreasing) in both γc and ωc, and decreasing
(increasing) in r.
Proof. I consider the function g(p, t,γc,ωc|ϑr) = Vcp Bt −Vct Bp = 0. By equations 3.21,
Vcr = γ
cBp + v′(p)
Vct = −(ωc + γcω) + γcBt
Then,
g(p, t,γc,ωc|ϑr) = v′(p)Bt + (ωc + γcω)Bp = 0
By the IFT,
dt
dγc
∣∣∣∣
ϑr
= −
∂g
∂γc
∂g
∂t
∣∣∣∣
ϑr
= − ωBp
v′(p)Btt + (ωc + γcω)Bpt
(3.37)
In order to test the sign of 3.37, I first obtain,
Btt = − f (ω
0)
1− t (ω
0)2
Bpt =
f (ω0)
1− t ω
0(pv′′(p) + v′(p))
(3.38)
Substituting in 3.37,
dt
dγc
∣∣∣∣
ϑr
= − −ω(1− F(ω
0))(pv′′(p) + v′(p))
f (ω0)
1−t ω0
[
(ωc + γcω)(pv′′(p) + v′(p))− v′(p)ω0
]
(3.39)
The numerator is positive for pv′′(p) + v′(p) < 0. The denominator is positive if
(ωc + γcω)(pv′′(p) + v′(p)) > v′(p)ω0. Then, dtdγc
∣∣∣∣
ϑr
< 0. Again, whenever the
budget constraint is binding, the sign of the effect of γc on optimal t is opposite to the
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sign of the effect of γc on p, and therefore, under the same condition, dpdγc
∣∣∣∣
ϑr
> 0.
Now I consider the effect of ωc on t,
dt
dωc
∣∣∣∣
ϑr
= −
∂g
∂ωc
∂g
∂t
∣∣∣∣
ϑr
= − Bp
v′(p)Btt + (ωc + γcω)Bpt
(3.40)
Therefore,
dt
dωc
∣∣∣∣
ϑr
= − −(1− F(ω
0))(pv′′(p) + v′(p))
f (ω0)
1−t
[
(ωc + γcω)(pv′′(p) + v′(p))− v′(p)ω0
]
(3.41)
The optimal t (p) is decreasing (increasing) in ωc if
(ωc + γcω)(pv′′(p) + v′(p)) > v′(p)ω0.
Lastly, I consider the effect of the fixed income transfer r on t (p),
dt
dr
∣∣∣∣
ϑr
= −
∂g
∂r
∂g
∂t
∣∣∣∣
ϑr
= −v
′(p)Btr + (ωc + γcω)Bpr
v′(p)Btt + (ωc + γcω)Bpt
(3.42)
Therefore,
dt
dr
∣∣∣∣
ϑr
= −
− f (ω0)1−t
[
(ωc + γcω)(pv′′(p) + v′(p))− v′(p)ω0
]
f (ω0)
1−t
[
(ωc + γcω)(pv′′(p) + v′(p))− v′(p)ω0
] = 1 (3.43)
Then, the optimal t (p) is increasing (decreasing) in r.
3.7.B Results: quasilinear preferences
Lemma 37B1 (Zero poverty and the median income). When there are no poor inV, a
Condorcet winner exists and coincides with the most preferred policy of the median income
voter.
Proof. Let ωm be the median income voter and qm her most preferred policy. Now I
consider the indirect utility function of a generic voter ω after replacing the value for
the tax rate when the constraint is binding,
V(p, r,ω) = v(p) + r +ω
[
1−ω−1(pv′(p) + r + K)
]
3.7. Appendices 99
A citizen ω will prefer a policy qz to qm if and only if,
V(pm, rm,ω) < V(pz, rz,ω)
v(pm) + rm − (v(pz) + rz) < ω
ω
[
pmv′(pm) + rm − (pzv′(pz) + rz)
]
Since qm is citizen ωm’s most preferred policy, for every qz 6= qm it must be,
ωm
ω
[
pmv′(pm) + rm − (pzv′(pz) + rz)
]
≤ v(pm) + rm − (v(pz) + rz)
This result opens three possibilities:
(i) pmv′(pm) + rm − (pzv′(pz) + rz) > 0, and then V(pm, rm,ω) ≥ V(pz, rz,ω) for
all ω ≤ ωm, so that at least half of the community prefers qm to qz.
(ii) pmv′(pm) + rm − (pzv′(pz) + rz) < 0, and then V(pm, rm,ω) ≥ V(pz, rz,ω) for
all ω ≥ ωm so that at least half of the community prefers qm to qz.
(iii) pmv′(pm) + rm − (pzv′(pz) + rz) = 0, and then v(pm) + rm ≥ v(pz) + rz and
tm = tz, so that all community prefers qm to qz.
Hence, qm is the Condorcet winner.
Proposition 37B2 (One-candidate equilibrium and the median income voter). Suppose
δ is small enough, and for every c ∈ C, the “default policy” (the policy implemented when
no candidate runs in elections) is less preferred than the most preferred policy of any other
potential candidate. Then, a one-candidate equilibrium satisfies:
(a) If all the potential candidates in C have the same income; then, the only candidate in E
is the one who values the profits the least.
(b) Suppose a and b in C are the two candidates who rank highest in the order of preferences
of the median income voter ωm; with γa = γb and ωa < ωb. Then, ra > rb.
Furthermore, b (a) is the only candidate if and only if,
ωm > (<) ta−tbd(ta)−d(tb)ω; with ti = d
′−1( ω
ωi
), and i = a, b.
Proof. Part (a). By contradiction. Let α =
(
αi
)
i∈C be a Nash equilibrium of the entry
game that results in the set of candidatesE(α) = {a}with a of type (ωa,γa). Suppose
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there exist a b ∈ C of type ωb = ωa and γb < γa.
I first prove that the tariff is weakly increasing in the candidates’ value of the profits
and the tax rate is weakly decreasing in the candidate’s income. In order to do this,
I clear r from the binding constraint. Then, I substitute the expression for r in the
indirect utility function of a generic i ∈ C,
S(p,γi) + T(t,ωi) = v(p)− (1+ γi)(pv′(p) + K)+ (1− d(t))ωi + tω (3.44)
In order to prove monotonicity, I take the mixed second order partial derivative of
S(·) w.r.t. p and γ:
∂S2
∂p∂γ
= −(pv′′(p) + v′(p)) > 0 (3.45)
Condition 3.45 is satisfied for every price below the monopoly price p < pM(0); and
therefore, the profits are weakly increasing in price. Next, I take the mixed second
order partial derivative of T(·) w.r.t. t and ω:
∂T2
∂t∂ω
= −d′(t) < 0 (3.46)
By regularity condition of d(t), d′(t) > 0. Then, ti is weakly decreasing in ωi. I just
proved that pb < pa; and tb = ta. In turn, the expected payoff of b of deviating by
entering is:
Pb
({a, b})ubb +(1− Pb({a, b}))uab − δ (3.47)
As the voters’ preferences are monotonically decreasing in p and t, all voters prefer b
to a. Then, it must be that Pb
({a, b}) = 1. Hence, for δ sufficiently small, b will enter
the competition, and therefore, a running unopposed cannot be an equilibrium. This
result applies to any d such that ωd = ωb and γd < γb. Then, when all candidates
have the same income, the only candidate must be the one with the lowest γ.
Part (b).
If γa = γb and ωa < ωb; then, from part a., pa = pb and ta > tb. Then, the difference
in the optimal lump-sum income transfer between candidates a and b is given by
ra − rb = ω(ta − tb) > 0; and therefore, ra > rb. By lemma 3.7.B.1, b is the only
candidate if and only if she is the most preferred option for the median income voter,
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i.e., (1− d(tb))ωm + tbω > (1− d(ta))ωm + taω. Clearing ωm,
ωm >
ta − tb
d(ta)− d(tb)ω (3.48)
The optimal tax for a and b is given by d′−1( ω
ωi
) with i = a, b. Therefore, the median
income voter will prefer b (a) to a (b) if and only if,
ωm > (<)
d′−1( ωωa )− d′−1( ωωb )
d(d′−1( ωωa ))− d(d′−1( ωωb ))
ω. (3.49)
Lemma 37B3 (Candidates’ vote share: Separating indifference line). For any two
feasible candidates i and k, there exist a unique pair (rik, cik), where rik is a vector in R2 and
cik a scalar, which satisfies,
u(qi,ω,γ) T u(qk,ω,γ) if and only if (rik1 , rik2 ) · (ω,γ) T cik
Furthermore, (rik, cik) is fully defined by the straight line u(qi,ω,γ)− u(qk,ω,γ) = 0,
named indifference line I{i, k}; and the intersection of I{i, k} with the space of voters defines
the vote shares of candidates i and k.
Proof. By construction. Consider the generic form of the indirect utility function,
u(q,ω,γ) = v(p) + (1− d(t))ω+ r + γΠ(p) (3.50)
Clearing the income transfer from the binding budget constraint, I obtain r = Π(p) +
tω; with Π(p) = −(pv′(p) + K). Replacing in 3.50,
u(q,ω,γ) = v(p) + (1− d(t))ω− (pv′(p) + K) + tω+ γ[− (pv′(p) + K)]
Now, I fix two candidates i and k, and get the expression for u(qi, ·)− u(qk, ·) = 0 as
follows,
u(qi,ω,γ)− u(qk,ω,γ) =v(pi)− v(pk) +
(− piv′(pi) + pkv′(pk))+ω(ti − tk)
−ω(d(ti)− d(tk))+ γ(− piv′(pi) + pkv′(pk)) = 0
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This equation is linear in both ω and γ. Therefore, it represents a line, name I{i, k}. In
this way, the spaceV∪CA is separated by I{i, k} in two convex disjoint half-spaces.
I{i, k} fully defines the pair (rik, cik) as follows,
cik = v(pi)− v(pk) +
(− piv′(pi) + pkv′(pk))+ω(ti − tk)
rik1 = d(ti)− d(tk)
rik2 = piv
′(pi)− pkv′(pk)
(3.51)
As the optimal policies of candidates i and k and the average incomeω fully parametrise
the vector and the scalar, for a given (i, k), I{i, k} is unique.
Corollary 37B4 (Slope of the indifference line). Fix a pair of candidates (i, k) such that
γi < γk. Furthermore, suppose I({i, k}) intersects the space of voters at ω∗ ∈ int(V). Then,
the slope of I({i, k}) is positive (negative) if and only if
v(pi)− v(pk) > (<) piv′(pi)− pkv′(pk)−ω(ti − tk).
Proof. The assumption that I({i, k}) intersects the voters’ line at ω∗ ∈ int(V) is
equivalent to (ω∗, 0) ∈ I({i, k}); then, I({i, k}) is defined by,
v(pi)− piv′(pi)− (v(pk)−pkv′(pk)) +ω(ti − tk) = ω∗
(
d(ti)− d(tk)
)
v(pi)− piv′(pi)− (v(pk)−pkv′(pk)) +ω(ti − tk) =
ω
(
d(ti)− d(tk)
)− γ(− piv′(pi) + pkv′(pk))
(3.52)
Now I name the components of 3.52 as following,
A(i, k) ≡ v(pi)− piv′(pi)− (v(pk)− pkv′(pk)) +ω(ti − tk)
B(i, k) ≡ d(ti)− d(tk)
D(i, k) ≡ −piv′(pi) + pkv′(pk)
(3.53)
I({i, k}) can be expressed as A(i, k) = ωB(i, k)− γD(i, k). Rearranging,
γ = −A(i, k)
D(i, k)
+
B(i, k)
D(i, k)
ω (3.54)
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If γi < γk, then pi < pk; and therefore, D(i, k) > 0 for every price below the monopoly
price. Then, I({i, k}) has a positive (negative) slope when B(i, k) > (<) 0. And this is
true iff,
d(ti) > (<) d(tk)
d(d′−1(
ω
ωi
)) > (<) d(d′−1(
ω
ωk
))
(3.55)
Therefore, by regularity conditions of function d(·), I({i, k}) has a positive (negative)
slope when ωi < (>)ωk. Furthermore, by equation 3.52, this happens if and only if
v(pi)− v(pk) > (<) piv′(pi)− pkv′(pk)−ω(ti − tk).
Definition 37B5 (Probability of winning under two-candidates). Fix two candidates i
and k in CA, and define the following sets:
Υ(i, k) = {ω ∈ V | u(qk,ω) < u(qi,ω)}
I(i, k) = {ω ∈ V | u(qk,ω) = u(qi,ω)}
(3.56)
If it is assumed that the distribution function F is absolutely continuous w.r.t. a Lebesgue
measure and each of the indifferent voters in set I flips a fair coin to decide who to vote for;
then, the fraction of the vote for each candidate is given by,
Φi({i, k}) = F(Υ(i, k)) + 12 F(I(i, k))
Φk({i, k}) = 1−Φi({i, k})
(3.57)
Then, the probability of winning in a two-candidate contest is given by,
Ps
({i, k}) =

1 if Φs({i, k}) > 12
1
2 if Φ
s({i, k}) = 12
0 if Φs({i, k}) < 12
(3.58)
with s = i, k.
Lemma 37B6 (Two-candidate equilibria: Incentive compatibility). Any equilibrium
with two candidates (i and k) satisfies,
(a) The indifference line intersects the space of voters at the median income,
(ωm, 0) ∈ I({i, k}); and therefore, the probabilities of winning of the candidates are
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both one-half, Pi
({i, k}) = Pk({i, k}) = 12 .
(b) There exist two lines, I−({i, k}) and I+({i, k}) parallel to I({i, k}), that define the
minimum horizontal distance between the candidates’ locations. This distance is given
by |4δ||d(ti)−d(tk)| .
Proof. Part (a). By lemma 7, for any two candidates i and k in CA, there exists a
unique line I({i, k}). By contradiction, suppose the median income voter strictly
prefers one of the candidates; i.e., (ωm, 0) /∈ I({i, k}). Lemma 6 shows that voters’
preferences satisfies the Gorman polar form; hence, the fraction of voters that prefers
the same candidate as the median income voter ωm must be greater than the fraction
who prefers any other candidate; i.e., either Φi({i, k}) > 12 or Φk({i, k}) > 12 (in terms
of probability of winning, either Pk
({i, k}) = 0 or Pi({i, k}) = 0). In this way, for any
δ > 0, the strategy of entering for the candidate with zero probability of winning is
dominated; and therefore, it cannot be a Nash equilibrium of the entry game. As
a result, any equilibrium with candidates i and k must satisfy (ωm, 0) ∈ I({i, k}).
Which implies, Pi
({i, k}) = Pk({i, k}) = 12 .
Part (b).
Any two-candidate equilibrium must satisfy the following system of Incentive Com-
patibility constraints (IC): 
1/2
(
uii − uki
) ≥ δ
1/2
(
ukk − uik
) ≥ δ (3.59)
These constraints define two disjoint sub-spaces inV∪CA,
A(i, k)−ωiB(i, k) + γiD(i, k) ≥ 2δ
A(i, k)−ωkB(i, k) + γkD(i, k) ≤ −2δ
(3.60)
with A(i, k), B(i, k), and D(i, k) as defined in equation 3.53.
Now, I define the lines I+({i, k}) and I−({i, k}) when the constraints in 3.60 are
binding as follows,
γi =
2δ− A(i, k)
D(i, k)
+
B(i, k)
D(i, k)
ωi
γk =
−2δ− A(i, k)
D(i, k)
+
B(i, k)
D(i, k)
ωk
(3.61)
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The horizontal distance between the two IC’s; i.e. the distance when γi = γk, is
|4δ|
|B(i,k)| with B(i, k) ≡ d(ti)− d(tk). Furthermore, from Part a., in any equilibrium with
candidates i and k, Im({i, k}) must intersect the set of voters at the median income
(ωm, 0). This is equivalent to,
A(i, k)−ωB(i, k) + γD(i, k) = 0
A(i, k)−ωmB(i, k) = 0
(3.62)
Since A(i, k), B(i, k), and D(i, k) are the same for I({a, b}), I+({a, b}), and I−({a, b}),
the three lines are parallel. Also, from 3.60, one candidate must be located to the right
of I+({i, k}) and the other to the left of I−{i, k}.
Proposition 37B7 (Tariff, income transfer and income inequality). In any two-candidate
equilibrium, the income transfer r increases with the income inequality iff ω > ωmd′(tk); and
the tariff of the public utility p decreases with the income inequality iff ω > L
(
pk,ω
)
ωmd′(tk);
with L
(
pk,ω
)
= pkv′′(pk)(− ∂tk∂pk )−1. Furthermore, the higher the income inequality the
poorer the candidates competing in elections.
Proof. By lemma 7, any two-candidate equilibrium (with candidates i and k) satisfies
I({i, k}) ∩V = (ωm, 0); i.e., A(i, k)−ωmB(i, k) = 0. Now, I define g as the function
that satisfies,
g(ω, qi, qk) = A(i, k)−ωmB(i, k) = 0 (3.63)
Fix qi, and the income transfer of candidate k. Then, by the IFT,
dpk
dω
= −
∂g
∂ω
∂g
∂pk
= − −t
k ∂tk
∂ω
∂A(i,k)
∂pk −ωm
∂B(i,k)
∂pk
= − −t
k ∂tk
∂ω
pkv′′(pk) + ∂t
k
∂pk
(
ωmd′(tk)−ω
)
d′(tk) > 1, pkv′′(pk) > 0 and ∂t
k
∂pk < 0. Furthermore,
∂tk
∂ω < 0 since,
t =
(1− F(ω0))(r + pv′(p))−W0 + K
ω−W0
As a result, if ω > L
(
pk,ω
)
ωmd′(tk); with L
(
pk,ω
)
= pkv
′′(pk)
− ∂tk
∂pk
. Then, p is decreasing
in ω. By lemma 4 and 5, ωk is decreasing in ω. Now fix qi, and the tariff of candidate
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k. Then, by the IFT,
drk
dω
= −
∂g
∂ω
∂g
∂rk
= − −t
k ∂tk
∂ω
∂tk
∂rk
(
∂A(i,k)
∂tk −ωm
∂B(i,k)
∂tk
) = − −tk ∂tk∂ω
∂tk
∂rk
(
ωmd′(tk)−ω
) (3.64)
When the budget constraint is binding, ∂t
k
∂rk = ω
−1. Then, if ω > ωmd′(tk), r is
increasing in ω.
3.7.C Results: multiple swing voters
Lemma 37C1 (The poor and the rich: Coalitions under two swing voters). In any
two-candidate equilibrium, there exist at most two swing voters who define three possible
coalition pairs,
(a) Coalition pair 1: all citizens in the poor group (P) vote for one candidate; and all
citizens in the rich group (R) vote for the other candidate.
(b) Coalition pair 2: the very poor (VP) vote for the same candidate as the rich middle
class (RMC); and the poor middle class (PMC) vote for the same candidate as the very
rich (VR).
(c) Coalition pair 3: the very poor (VP) vote for the same candidate as the very rich
(VR); and the poor middle class (PMC) vote for the same candidate as the rich middle
class (RMC).
Where the group VP (VR) comprises all voters located to the left (right) of ωP∗(i, k)
(ωR∗(i, k)). In turn, PMC (RMC) refers to the group of voters located to the left (right) of
ω0(·) and the right (left) of ωP∗(i, k) (ωR∗(i, k)).
Proof. I first assume there exist two swing voters, one in group P and the other in
group R. Then, I define the swing voter in group P, ω∗P(i, k), as the income level that
makes a poor voter indifferent between i and k,
ψ
(
(1− t(ri, pi))ω∗P(i, k) + ri
pi
)
= ψ
(
(1− t(rk, pk))ω∗P(i, k) + rk
pk
)
(3.65)
3.7. Appendices 107
By monotonicity of ψ(·),
(1− t(ri, pi))ω∗P(i, k) + ri
pi
=
(1− t(rk, pk))ω∗P(i, k) + rk
pk
ω∗P(i, k) =
pirk − pkri
pk − pi + pit(rk, pk)− pkt(ri, pi)
(3.66)
In turn, the swing voter in group R, ω∗R(i, k), is the income level that makes a rich
voter indifferent between i and k,
v(pi) + (1− t(ri, pi))ω∗R(i, k) + ri = v(pk) + (1− t(rk, pk))ω∗R(i, k) + rk
ω∗R(i, k) =
v(pk)− v(pi) + rk − ri
t(rk, pk)− t(ri, pi)
(3.67)
In 3.66, if pk − pi + pit(rk, pk)− pkt(ri, pi) > (<) 0, it must be that pirk − pkri > (<) 0.
And then, every ωP > (<)ω∗P(i, k) prefers i to k. Therefore, there exists at most one
swing voter in group P. Analogously in 3.67, if t(rk, pk)− t(ri, pi) > (<) 0, it must be
that v(pk)− v(pi) + rk − ri > (<) 0. And then, every ωR > (<)ω∗R(i, k) prefers i to
k. Therefore, there exists at most one swing voter in group R.
Furthermore, when every ωP > (<)ω∗P(i, k) prefers i to k, and every
ωR > (<)ω∗R(i, k) prefers i to k, coalition pair 2 takes place. In turn, when every
ωP > (<)ω∗P(i, k) prefers i to k, and every ωR < (>)ω∗R(i, k) prefers i to k, coalition
pair 3 takes place. Lastly, Coalition pair 1 emerges when there exists only one swing
voter that coincides with ω0(·).
Lemma 37C2 (Two candidates, one poverty line). In any equilibrium with candidates i
and k, if either coalition pair 1 or coalition pair 2 take place; then, there exist one and only one
income threshold; i.e., ω0(i) = ω0(k). The income threshold common to candidates i and k is
named ω0(i, k).
Proof. Any two-candidate equilibrium with i and k must satisfy,
Pi({i, k}) = Pk({i, k}) = 12
And this is equivalent to Φi({i, k}) = Φk({i, k}) = 12 . Now I suppose that coalition
pair 2 takes place, and by lemma 3.7.C.1, the swing voters in each of the groups are
such that any ω ∈ P satisfying ω > ω∗P(i, k) prefers k to i; and any ω ∈ R satisfying
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ω > ω∗R(i, k) prefers k to i. Then, in equilibrium,
F
(
ω∗P(i, k)
)
+ F
(
ω∗R(i, k)
)− F(ω0(i)) = 12
F
(
ω∗P(i, k)
)
+ F
(
ω∗R(i, k)
)− F(ω0(k)) = 12 (3.68)
Therefore, F
(
ω0(i)
)
= F
(
ω0(k)
) ⇐⇒ ω0(i) = ω0(k).
Lastly, under coalition pair 1, F
(
ω0(k)
)
= 12 and F
(
ω0(i)
)
= 12 . Then, it must be that
ω0(i) = ω0(k).
Proposition 37C3 (Tariff, income transfer and the poor). Under coalition pair 1 both the
tariff and the income transfer decrease with the size of the poor.
Proof. Fix candidate k. Then, any equilibrium where the poor vote for k, and the rich
vote for i must satisfy,
F
(
ω∗0(i, k)
)− 12 = 0
where ω0(i) = ω0(k) = ω∗0(i, k) is the swing voter. In terms of lemma 3.7.C.1,
ω∗0(i, k) =
v(pk)− v(pi) + rk − ri
t(rk, pk)− t(ri, pi) =
pirk − pkri
pk − pi + pit(rk, pk)− pkt(ri, pi)
Now suppose that F(ω∗0) goes up. After this change in the distribution,
Pk({i, k}) > 1/2; and therefore, it cannot be a two-candidate equilibrium. In order to
restore the equilibrium, candidate i must be one such that the only swing voter is
now poor; i.e., some poor vote for her. I then consider a poor citizen close enough to
the income threshold, ωP = ω∗0(i, k)− e; and obtain,
∂V(qi,ωP)
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
k,ti
= ψ′(·)
[− v(pi) + p2i ψ′−1′(pi) + (1− ti)e]
p2i
Since ψ′−1′(pi) < 0 and ∂ri∂pi = ψ
′−1′(pi)pi + ψ′−1(pi) > 0; then,
∂V(qi,ωP)
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
k,ti
< 0 and ∂V(qi,ω
P)
∂ri
∣∣∣∣
k,ti
< 0 i f e is small enough. (3.69)
Therefore, under coalition pair 1, the tariff and the income transfer are decreasing in
the size of the poor group.
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Proposition 37C4 (Tariff, income transfer and the very poor). Suppose coalition pair 2
takes place. Fix an equilibrium with candidates i and k such that pk < pi. Then,
(a) The tariff and the income transfer are decreasing in F(ωP) when the tax rate is fixed.
(b) The income transfer is increasing in F(ωP) when the tariff is fixed.
(c) The tariff is either increasing or decreasing in F(ωP) when the income transfer is fixed.
Proof. Fix candidate k and recall from lemma 3.7.C that ω0(k) = ω0(i). Then, condi-
tion 3.68 in lemma 3.7.C.2 defines the following implicit function:
g(qi, F | k) = F
(
ω∗P(qi | k)
)
+ F
(
ω∗R(qi | k)
)− F(ω0(k))− 12 = 0 (3.70)
By the IFT and with abuse of notation, the effect of changes in the distribution on the
tariff and the income transfer are given by,
dpi
dF
∣∣∣∣
k,ri
= −
∂g
∂F
∂g
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
k,ri
; dridF
∣∣∣∣
k,pi
= −
∂g
∂F
∂g
∂ri
∣∣∣∣
k,pi
dpi
dF
∣∣∣∣
k,ti
= −
∂g
∂F
∂g
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
k,ti
; dridF
∣∣∣∣
k,ti
= −
∂g
∂F
∂g
∂ri
∣∣∣∣
k,ti
(3.71)
In order to test the signs of the effects defined in 3.71, I first obtain,
∂g
∂pi
= f
(
ω∗P
)∂ω∗P
∂pi
+ f
(
ω∗R
)∂ω∗R
∂pi
∂g
∂ri
= f
(
ω∗P
)∂ω∗P
∂ri
+ f
(
ω∗R
)∂ω∗R
∂ri
;
(3.72)
where ω∗P is defined in 3.7.C.1 and its derivative w.r.t. pi is given by,
∂ω∗P
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
k,ri
=
rk
(
pk − pi + pitk − pkti
)
+ (pirk − pkri)(1− tk + pk ∂ti∂pi )(
pk − pi + pitk − pkti
)2
Then,
∂ω∗P
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
k,ri
> 0 i f 1− tk > −pk ∂ti∂pi (3.73)
As the income threshold is fixed, it must be that ti = 1− ψ
′−1(pi)pi−ri
ω0(k) ; and therefore,
∂ti
∂pi
= − (ψ′−1(pi))′pi+ψ′−1(pi)
ω0(k) < 0. Then, by replacing this expression for
∂ti
∂pi
in ∂ω
∗P
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
k,ri
,
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condition 3.73 is satisfied for every pk < pi. The interpretation is that the support of
the poor to candidate i is decreasing in pi when the impact of the increased tariff on
the taxes is small enough.
Next, I use the definition of ω∗R from 3.7.C.1 to define the effect of the tariff on the
rich swing voter as follows,
∂ω∗R
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
k,ri
=
−v′(pi)(tk − ti)− (− ∂ti∂pi )(v(pk)− v(pi) + rk − ri)(
tk − ti
)2
This expression can be either positive or negative. As a consequence,
∂g
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
k,ri
> 0 i f f
(
ω∗P
)
∂ω∗P
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
k,ri
> f
(
ω∗R
)
∂ω∗R
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
k,ri
(3.74)
Now, I consider the effect of ri on the poor swing voter as follows,
∂ω∗P
∂ri
∣∣∣∣
k,pi
=
−pk
(
pk − pi + pitk − pkti
)
+ pk
∂ti
∂ri
(pirk − pkri)(
pk − pi + pitk − pkti
)2
Given that ∂ti∂ri = ω
0(k)−1, ω∗P decreases with ri if the partial effect on ψ of a higher ri
is greater than the absolute value of the effect on ψ of the higher ti that is needed to
satisfy the budget constraint; i.e., ∂ω
∗P
∂ri
∣∣∣∣
k,pi
< 0 if
dψ(
ω(1− ti) + ri
pi
) = ψ′(·)p−1i dri − ψ′(·)p−1i ω
∂ti
∂ri
dri > 0 (3.75)
And this happens when ω < ω0(·). Then, ∂ω∗P∂ri
∣∣∣∣
k,pi
< 0.
Similarly, I consider the effect of ri on the rich swing voter as follows,
∂ω∗R
∂ri
∣∣∣∣
k,pi
=
−(tk − ti)+ ∂ti∂ri (v(pk)− v(pi) + rk − ri)(
tk − ti
)2
Replacing the expressions for ∂ti∂ri , ti, and tk,
∂ω∗R
∂ri
∣∣∣∣
k,pi
=
ψ(ψ′−1(pi))− ψ(ψ′−1(pk))
ω0(i)
(
tk − ti
)2 (3.76)
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Since ψ(ψ′−1(pi))− ψ(ψ′−1(pk)) < 0 if and only if pk < pi. Then, ∂ω∗R∂ri
∣∣∣∣
k,pi
< 0.
Next, I conduct a similar analysis but in this case by fixing ti in order to examine on
the trade-off between tariff and income transfer,
∂ω∗P
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
k,ti
=
(rk − ∂ri∂pi pk)
(
pk − pi + pitk − pkti
)
+ (pirk − pkri)(1− tk)(
pk − pi + pitk − pkti
)2
∂ω∗P
∂ri
∣∣∣∣
k,ti
=
( ∂pi∂ri rk − pk)
(
pk − pi + pitk − pkti
)
+ (pirk − pkri) ∂pi∂ri (1− tk)(
pk − pi + pitk − pkti
)2
Then,
∂ω∗P
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
k,ti
> 0 and ∂ω
∗P
∂ri
∣∣∣∣
k,ti
> 0 i f ∂ri∂pi pk < rk (3.77)
Condition 3.77 is always satisfied if pk < pi.
In turn,
∂ω∗R
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
k,ti
=
(−v′(pi)− ∂ri∂pi )(tk − ti)(
tk − ti
)2
∂ω∗R
∂ri
∣∣∣∣
k,ti
=
(−1− v′(pi) ∂pi∂ri )(tk − ti)(
tk − ti
)2
Then,
∂ω∗R
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
k,ti
> 0 and ∂ω
∗R
∂ri
∣∣∣∣
k,ti
> 0 i f ∂ri∂pi < −v′(pi) (3.78)
Replacing by ∂ri∂pi = (ψ
′−1(pi))′pi + ψ′−1(pi) > 0, it is straightforward showing that
condition 3.78 is always satisfied.
Lastly, I assess the response of g to a change in the distribution. In particular, I
consider an increase in the size of the very poor group (F(ωP) increases). From the
implicit function 3.70, it is straightforward showing that ∂g
∂F(ωP) > 0. Then, the signs
of the responses of tariff and income transfer to an increase in the size of the very
poor are given by,
dpi
dF(ωP)
∣∣∣∣
k,ri
= −
∂g
∂F(ωP)
∂g
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
k,ri
≷ 0 ; dridF(ωP)
∣∣∣∣
k,pi
= −
∂g
∂F(ωP)
∂g
∂ri
∣∣∣∣
k,pi
> 0
dpi
dF(ωP)
∣∣∣∣
k,ti
= −
∂g
∂F(ωP)
∂g
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
k,ti
< 0 ; dridF(ωP)
∣∣∣∣
k,ti
= −
∂g
∂F(ωP)
∂g
∂ri
∣∣∣∣
k,ti
< 0
(3.79)
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Corollary 37C5 (Tariff and income transfer under coalition pair 3). Suppose coalition
pair 3 takes place. Then, if ∂r/∂p is small enough, the tariff (income transfer) is decreasing in
F(ωP) when the tax rate is fixed.
Proof. I first define the implicit function that corresponds to an equilibrium under
coalition pair 3 as follows,
g(qk, F | i) = F
(
ω∗R(qk | i)
)− F(ω∗P(qk | i))− 12 = 0
By the IFT,
dpk
dF(ωP)
∣∣∣∣
i,tk
= −
∂g
∂F(ωP)
∂g
∂pk
∣∣∣∣
i,tk
; dridF(ωP)
∣∣∣∣
i,tk
= −
∂g
∂F(ωP)
∂g
∂rk
∣∣∣∣
i,tk
(3.80)
And,
∂g
∂pk
= − f (ω∗P)∂ω∗P
∂pk
+ f
(
ω∗R
)∂ω∗R
∂pk
∂g
∂rk
= − f (ω∗P)∂ω∗P
∂rk
+ f
(
ω∗R
)∂ω∗R
∂rk
(3.81)
From lemma 3.7.C.2, under coalition pair 3, the numerator and the denominator of
ωP(i, k) are negative and those of ωR(i, k) positive. Then, inverting the labels of
candidates i and k in equations 3.77 and 3.78,
∂ω∗P
∂pk
∣∣∣∣
i,tk
> 0 and ∂ω
∗P
∂rk
∣∣∣∣
i,tk
> 0 i f ∂rk∂pk <
ri
pi (3.82)
∂ω∗R
∂pk
∣∣∣∣
i,tk
< 0 and ∂ω
∗R
∂rk
∣∣∣∣
i,tk
< 0 i f ∂rk∂pk < −v′(pk) (3.83)
Therefore,
dpk
dF(ωP)
∣∣∣∣
i,tk
< 0 and drkdF(ωP)
∣∣∣∣
i,tk
< 0. (3.84)
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